

Kashmir continues to be a potential flash point, but compromise by either side would threaten natural cohesion and political stability. But neither side wants war, and both have affirmed their desire to avoid it. In this context, co-operative monitoring of several types warrants closer assessment. A rich menu of possible opportunities, depending on how political conditions evolve, exists.

At least for now, formal and negotiated reductions in conventional forces seem unlikely; however, CBMs such as operational constraints have been put into effect, including notification of major troop movements and exercises and joint patrols in border areas such as Punjab and Rajasthan and information exchanges on the movement of major equipment into training areas. A further step could be demobilization of border forces, which would markedly reduce regional tensions; India and Pakistan could request UN peacekeeping operations to monitor the troop reductions along the borders. A potential agreement could be co-operatively monitored, including possibly limited "Open Skies" overflights and NTM or ITM.

A bilateral nuclear test ban would be a good step toward slowing and capping nuclear proliferation in South Asia. It might be pursued as an adjunct to CTBT talks and then could be formally linked to the CTBT. Interest in Delhi and Islamabad in signalling a desire to avoid all-out nuclear competition could provide a needed incentive. The verification regime for a test ban might include use of existing seismic stations, backed by upgraded capabilities and new stations, non-seismic monitoring, data exchanges, co-operative monitoring, and on-site inspections. Co-operative monitoring could include aerial surveillance, joint seismic stations, limited aerial overflights and, possibly, invitational inspections conducted by UN personnel. The overflights would be conducted at regular intervals as part of a confidence-building regime or after anomalous seismic events. The invitational inspections could be used to clarify ambiguous events or activities.

Turning to another area, progress toward a global cut-off may open new opportunities in South Asia. In particular, verification experiments on monitoring plutonium production and uranium enrichment, with application of suitable technologies, could help build confidence in the technical feasibility of verifying a freeze on the production of fissile materials. This could foster greater readiness to join a global cut-off or to take parallel regional actions. Specifics could include experiments on plutonium production, measuring isotopic concentrations, or total thermal power output using infrared aerial detection. Invitational inspections also could be conducted to build confidence in verification. As a starting point for monitoring uranium enrichment facilities, experiments in sampling of uranium enrichment—in return for access to reprocessing—could be initiated. Still another possibility could include a U.S.- or UN-sponsored joint verification experiment at U.S. facilities for India, Pakistan and other countries.

Should Delhi and Islamabad choose to avoid a regional missile race, co-operative monitoring could also assist in curbing ballistic missile proliferation. Monitoring of a ban on ballistic missile production or a freeze on long-range missile testing and deployment could benefit from the application of space or aerial surveillance and on-site inspections utilizing a variety of sensor technologies.

Korean Peninsula

The current tension over North Korea's possible possession of nuclear weapons poses major diplomatic, military and monitoring challenges. It remains uncertain whether North Korea will accept comprehensive IAEA inspections, as required under the NPT, to provide assurance that its future nuclear program will be peaceful. But even if North Korea accepts more intrusive IAEA inspections on its nuclear production and waste facilities, questions will remain about its possible operational nuclear capabilities.

