

with a common interest, in matters of intelligence each nation is inclined to regard at least some of the others as potential (if not actual) opponents.

Despite such sensitivities, there are lessons to be derived from the experiences of intelligence organizations and agencies which can be applied to verification. It is the practice of many intelligence agencies to keep the groups involved in the various means of collection of information in carefully separated "watertight" compartments. Primary reasons for this are to preserve security regarding the means of collection, and the identities of informers and agents, and to minimize compromise in the event that secrecy is breached. Assembly and analysis of the information collected from the various sources is performed by a separate group, very much smaller than that concerned with collection.*

Synergy consists of combination and correlation of inputs from several sources producing a final result beyond what could be achieved by the separate inputs themselves. In the examination of major failures of intelligence to foresee serious disasters it has usually been found that evidence indicating the coming situation had been collected, but not taken into account by the all-source analysis.

A further problem is caused by the rivalry sometimes present among the intelligence agencies within a major country, which vie for power and influence and refuse to share their source material.

Within a large nation, some of the organizations and agencies likely to conduct collection and analysis of intelligence that could aid in verification of arms control agreements could include: army, navy, air force, department of defence, foreign office, other ministries such as commerce, energy, or science & technology,

civilian law enforcement agencies, and non-government organizations concerned with defence and arms control.

There may be a better opportunity to apply synergy to verification than to intelligence. Because of the reduced pressure for secrecy there will be less reason to keep the various sources of information separated from one another and from the group responsible for synthesis and analysis. Useful feedback from analysts to sources should be easier to maintain. When facts emerge which are difficult to explain, it should be possible to obtain the advice of well-informed persons or groups not integral to the intelligence or verification communities. On the other hand, considerations of commercial secrecy are likely to be more evident in the verification of some types of multilateral arms control.

The comparison of the voluminous information required by data exchanges with the observation of actual deployments offers a form of synergy dependent on careful selection and analysis. If aerial inspection is permitted, this should offer great opportunities for synergy with on-site inspections, for example in scheduling of visits, providing cues for the inspectors to pursue, and for the interpretation of results. Timing of overflights could be synchronized to observe locations between the request for an on-site inspection and the arrival of the inspection team, to monitor possible removal of equipment. If permanently sited unmanned sensors are deployed, their signals could provide useful cues as to locations deserving inspection or overflight, or evidence of hurried removal prior to inspection.

It may be more difficult to obtain synergy with the inputs from NTM sources, since they retain the need to protect secrecy regarding the means and success of collection. However it

* It has been estimated that in the 1970s the United States expended 91% of its intelligence costs on collection, and only 9% on all-source analysis. See "Intelligence and Arms Control Verification", by Michael Herman. Chapter 19 in Verification Report 1991: Yearbook on Arms Control and Environmental Agreements. J.B. Poole (ed), VERTIC, London, 1991. p. 191.

