

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

Since "by the term attack Sweden understands all attacks on the facilities in question which cause release or dissemination of radioactive material, the question if the facility itself has been the intended target or if the damage is incidental is in the Swedish opinion of less significance". The necessity to prevent mass destruction should at any given time prevail over other interests. From this follows "that any attack on military targets in the vicinity of nuclear facilities must be planned and performed so as to exclude any possibility of radioactive material being released. Given the high precision in today's weapons this is no overwhelming task. Furthermore, the existence of protective zones might give rise to the temptation to use them as military sanctuaries, thereby enhancing the risk of military targets being placed close to nuclear facilities and consequently also the risk of accidental damage being caused to the facilities. Actually, the protective zones could in some instances diminish the very safety they were intended to enhance".

"Physical identification (marking) of nuclear facilities poses great problems for some governments fearing that such markings could cause worry to the population to such an extent that the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes could be made difficult. However, Sweden has no objection to such markings, should States Parties wish to make them. However, we consider that such identification should be voluntary, and that absence of such markings in no way should relieve any Party of its obligations according to other provisions of the treaty. A norm for physical identification is provided in the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Annex I, Article 16."

I have now commented on some of the major issues so far discussed in the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. Other important issues remain and some of them have not yet been dealt with in the Committee. May I therefore conclude this statement by expressing my intention to revert to this matter at a later stage, should the development of the negotiations prompt me to do so.