

that the doctrine of the Institutes is not that the existing thing called matter is incapable of existing, except as apprehended by the existing thing called mind, and that the existing thing called mind is incapable of existing, except as apprehending an existing object. Matter is not viewed as one existing thing, and mind as another existing thing at all. Mind and its object are considered to be two factors, each of which is indispensable to existence; and the only things which really and independently exist are Minds-in-union-with-Somewhat.

It is apparent that this doctrine cannot be established empirically; for even should all the things whose existence is discovered to us by experience be Minds-in-union-with-Somewhat, it would not follow that these are the only existences possible. Professor Ferrier accordingly disdains the aid of empiricism. Throughout the Institutes he makes not a single appeal, for the purpose of proving the main doctrine of the work, to contingent facts; but starting from what is regarded as a position of necessary truth, he essays to work out his system by a chain of strictly demonstrative reasoning.

His conclusions with respect to Being are based upon a peculiar theory of Knowing. His Ontology has an Epistemology for its forerunner; and, as the doctrine of the former is, that what *exists* is the synthesis of subject and object; so that of the latter, in which the way is paved for the Ontology, is, that what is *known* is the synthesis of subject and object. It will of course be understood, after what is stated in the preceding paragraph, that the Epistemology of the Institutes is a theory, not of the contingent structure of our cognitions, but of the necessary structure of all cognitions. A subject (self) cannot be known *per se* by any intelligence; neither can objects (things or thoughts) be known *per se* by any intelligence. The object (properly so called) which any intelligence apprehends, is constituted by the union of two factors, the object (popularly so called), and the apprehending mind. The result of the whole investigation may be summed up in a quasi-algebraical formula, which we may call, in Professor Ferrier's own phraseology, "the equation of the 'known and the existent.'" Let k be what is known; and e , what exists; then $k=e$ =self-cum-alio.

As a condition of the possibility of demonstrating that what any intelligence knows is a synthesis of subject and object, we must at the very outset have a definition of knowledge; for, from the nature of the case, no necessary conclusions can be established regarding that of which a definition has not been laid down. Should any one say that we are unable to render an account of what knowledge is,