HENRY BECHER, of the City of London, and JOHN CAMERON, of the Town of Strathroy, Esquires, Barristers-at-Law. McLEOD STEWART, of the City of Ottawa; and JOHN McFAYDEN, of the Village of Mount Forest, Gentlemen, Attorneys-at-Law. (Gazetted Sept. 28th, 1872.)

JOHN MARTIN, of the City of London, Esquire, Barrister-at-Law. (Gazetted October 5th, 1872.)

JOHN BLEVINS, of the City of Toronto, Esquire, Barrister-at-Law. (Gazetted October 12th, 1872.)

ASSOCIATE CORONERS.

THOMAS SWAN, Esquire, M. B., for the County of Waterloo.

DAVID BURNET, Esquire, M. B., for the United Counties of Northumberland and Durham.

JOHN DOUGALD McLEAY, Esquire, M. D., for the County of Middlesex. (Gazetted June 1st, 1872.)

FRANCIS LAMB HOWLAND, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Oxford.

NOBLE BENJAMIN HALL DEAN, Esquire, M.D., for the United Counties of Northumberland and Durham.

WILLIAM O'DELL ROBINSON, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Waterloo. (Gazetted June 15th, 1872.)

GEORGE DAVID LOUGHEED, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Lambton.

MARSHALL MARSELLUS PULASKI DEAN, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Peterborough. (Gazetted June 22nd, 1872.)

LOTHROP PAXTON SMITH, Esquire, for the United Counties of Northumberland and Durham. (Gazetted June 29th, 1872.)

ALEXANDER STEPHENS, Esquire, M.D., for the District of Parry Sound. (Gazetted July 6th, 1872.)

PHILIP HOWARD SPOHN, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Simcoe. (Gazetted July 13th, 1872.)

RICHARD KING, Esquire, M.D., for the United Counties of Northumberland and Durham. (Gazetted July 27th, 1872.)

GEORGE NIEMEIER, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Bruce. (Gazetted August 10th, 1872.)

ROBERT HERBERT HUNT, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Grey. (Gazetted August 17th, 1872.)

CHARLES D. TUFFORD, Esq., M.D., for the County of Middlesex. (Gazetted August 31st, 1872.)

JOHN CHURCH CHAMBERLAIN, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Lennox and Addington. (Gazetted Sept. 14th, 1872.)

ALGERNON WOOLVERTON, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Wentworth. (Gazetted September 21st, 1872.)

WILLIAM DeWITT CLINTON LAW, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Simcoe. (Gazetted Sept. 21st, 1872.)

WILLIAM B. FOWLER, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Huron. (Gazetted October 5th, 1872.)

GEORGE MILLER AYLSWORTH, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Huron.

BALDWIN LORENZO BRADLEY, Esquire, M.D., for the County of Oxford. (Gazetted October 12th, 1872.)

THE PRESS AND THE BAR.—Many years ago resolutions were passed by the members of the Oxford and western circuits declaring it to be incompatible with the status of a barrister to report proceedings for the public press. The resolution on the Oxford circuit was aimed at Mr. Cooks Evans, who then represented the *Times*, and on the western circuit at Mr. H. T. Cole (now a Queen's counsel), who then reported for the *Morning Chronicle*. The dictum of the Oxford and western circuits was warmly resented by the press. By way of retaliation the *Times* adopted a plan that was followed by many other journals, and which soon led to the rescinding of the obnoxious resolutions. The leading journal stated that it was of no importance to the general public, however important it might be to the legal gentlemen themselves, to know what particular counsel appeared in any case. Accordingly instructions were given to the *Times* representatives on the Oxford and western circuits to suppress the names of all the barristers who appeared in cases reported in that paper. Hence for some time in the reports of these circuits, the public read that "the counsel for the plaintiff," "the counsel for the defendant," "the counsel for the prosecution," and "the counsel for the prisoner," said or did so and so. This was a serious matter for the bar, and no doubt materially hastened the withdrawal of the objectionable stigma sought to be cast upon the press.—*Gentlemen's Magazine.*

NISI PRIUS.—The origin of the term *nisi prius* was rather curious, and illustrates the startling fictions that our fathers delighted to honor. Formerly, in order to send a cause to trial at the assizes, two writs were directed to the sheriff. By the first writ, called a "venire," the sheriff was commanded to cause a jury to come to Westminster The second writ, called a "distringas," supposed the jurors to have disobeyed the first writ, and commanded the sheriff to distrain their goods, so as to compel them to come to Westminster on a certain day, unless before that day a judge of assize should come to the place where the cause was intended to be tried, as in practice he always did. The words of this writ *nisi prius* gave the name to the ordinary sittings for trying causes. The fiction maintained by these writs was not only useless, but pernicious, for an irregularity in returning them might deprive a plaintiff of the benefit of his verdict. All that was really necessary was, that the sheriff should take care to have in attendance at the assizes a number of jurymen sufficient for the trial of the causes likely to be entered.—*Albany Law Journal.*

THE DECISIONS OF JUSTICES.—The unpaid magistracy is the most abused institution of the country. Very likely some of their decisions are wrong; but it is ridiculous to form an opinion from the newspaper reports, because important incidents of the case are omitted. Writers who propose to abolish the "great unpaid" do not take the trouble to consider the subject. The substitution of paid magistrates would be costly if it were possible, but, however willing the public might be to pay the cost, it would be impossible to find the requisite number of men. Besides, the magistrates are fully qualified to discharge their duties, and, with some exceptions, they do so satisfactorily. The abolition of the unpaid magistracy would be a disastrous social revolution. A writer in the *Times* complains that the decisions of justices cannot be reversed unless the justices themselves reserve any question for the Court of Criminal Appeal. What would be the result of giving an unlimited right of appeal? We apprehend that two Courts of Appeal would be fully and constantly occupied in disposing of such appeals Perhaps in the instance cited by "Stuff-gown," the justices were wrong, but as a rule, when any point is raised, the bench is ready to grant an appeal. Besides, the justices do not sit with closed doors, and their critics in the press are extreme to note the slightest error. We see no danger to the public, and a great convenience, in reserving to the justices the right to refuse an appeal from their decisions.—*Law Journal.*