

legal rights; and having selected his own fundamental line of distinction between them, proceeds in the rest of his book to enumerate and discuss the general nature of the legal rights falling under the different categories thus arrived at, not hesitating, happily, to illustrate and explain them liberally by reference to the actual rules of Roman and English law.

The matter would perhaps have been clearer to the ordinary student if it had been explained, as the fact is, that the rights thus dealt with are distinguished from one another, not as different in themselves, but as arising out of different relations. Thus the right of an owner of a piece of land to take possession of it, and the right of a leasehold tenant of a piece of land to take possession of it, are, regarded in detachment, the same kind of rights. Each is a right to take possession of land. But we do not find them classified together by Professor Holland. Why? Because they are the legal consequence of, and arise out of, two quite different relations. The one arises out of the relation between a man who owns a piece of property and people in general. The other arises out of the relation between lessor and lessee under a contract of lease.

So quite consistently with his definition of Jurisprudence, what Professor Holland really distinguishes between are the various relations between men generally recognized in mature systems of law; and legal rights are only distinguished by him as arising out of, or being 'the legal consequence' of, distinct relations.

Thus the subject-matter of Jurisprudence being these various relations between human beings and the conceptions involved in the comprehension of these relations, how does it treat this subject-matter and what does it do with it? It enumerates and defines these relations, and classifies them according to a rational and logical method; it defines the conceptions involved in them and in the legal consequences, i.e. the rights and obligations following upon them, such as 'right,' 'duty,' 'remedy,' 'ownership,' 'contract,' 'possession'; and it indicates, in connexion with each, the general character of those legal consequences.

Such being the subject-matter of Jurisprudence, and the way it aims to deal with this subject-matter, what is the value of it all? What would we gain from such a science, if perfected? In the first place we should have arrived at an accurate analysis, explanation, and, consequently apprehension of the terms which lawyers have to use, and the conceptions with which they deal; and as Austin himself somewhere says: 'It really is important that men should think distinctly and speak with a meaning.' And in the second place we should have a logically consistent and complete ground-plan of the whole field of law, enabling us, as it were, so to arrange