

## REPORT

### UPON THE BEST METHOD OF GIVING EFFECT TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., REGARDING THE CANADIAN MILITIA.

BY

Major General Sir P. H. N. Lake, Inspector General, K.C.M.G., C.B.

#### *The Honourable the Minister of Militia and Defence:*

1. You have asked me, as your chief military adviser, for a memorandum upon the report, dated July 5, 1910, submitted to you by General Sir John French, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Inspector General, Imperial Forces, as the result of his tour of inspection of the militia of the Dominion, with a view to considering how far and in what manner it may be most feasible and advantageous to give effect to his recommendations; with which, I may perhaps be permitted to say, I am, speaking generally, in complete accord.

#### ORGANIZATION.

2. The Imperial Inspector General, after stating that he deals with western and eastern Canada separately, begins by discussing the question of organization. He attaches the highest importance to the peace organization of the forces being identical with the organization contemplated for war.

3. In regard to Canada, west of the great lakes, he does not, in view of the rapid developments now taking place in that part of the country, make any definite recommendations in regard to organization. The following remarks, therefore, under this heading apply only to eastern Canada.

4. After stating, in forcible terms, the advantages to be derived from the harmonious working together of the different arms and their mutual support in war, he states, equally forcibly, the drawbacks which he perceives to exist in our present peace organization from its not being identical with our war organization.

5. Our present organization in commands being based rather upon areas than on the distribution of units, he points out that the correct proportion between the various arms in those areas does not usually obtain, and that existing corps have been raised according to local likings and idiosyncrasies. This is, of course, quite true, and indeed will usually be the case in voluntarily raised forces. Witness the great effort necessary in the United Kingdom before the scientifically organized territorial force could be called into being to replace the previously existing auxiliary forces, which were open to precisely these same criticisms.

6. He points out the difficulties from which our war divisions, to be formed as such only on mobilization, would suffer. He says that 'the annual camp trainings