

policy for the immediate future. Most urgent of these political concerns is how sanctions can not only be made to happen, but to work.

**The sanctions option**

Sanctions are sometimes presented as the trumpet blast that will bring down the walls of apartheid. Such a

**Table 2**

Some Canadian imports from South Africa affected by trade restrictions or boycotts		
Commodity	Percent of 1983 imports to Canada from SA	Nature of action
Uranium for reprocessing	19.0	New contracts terminated by Federal Govt. in July 1986
Kruggerands	13.1	Voluntary restraint by Canadian banks — virtually eliminated in 1984
Raw sugar	8.8	Renegotiation of contracts
Fruit	10.0	Consumer campaigns intensified in mid-1985
Alcohol	1.6	Boycotts by seven provinces

view is dubious since it ignores the practical reality that it is South Africans themselves — black and white — who are the driving force for change in the country. If this is true, the function of sanctions is to add weight to that movement by increasing the political, economic and psychological costs of sustaining apartheid. The internationally open economy on which white prosperity is based assures that these pressures will be felt in government and the white community as a whole. The meeting between white businessmen and the ANC, and the scramble to restore foreign bank confidence in the Rand in September are two obvious examples of this vulnerability.

It is for this reason that most black leaders are calling for further Western pressure. Anyone who has witnessed the grinding poverty of the homelands or the squalor of the large townships can imagine why black South Africans would be prepared for further sacrifices to end apartheid. The boycotts by blacks of white shops is proof of the economic hardships many are already embracing for this goal. Sanctions cannot ensure peaceful change — but they can help tip the balance in its favor.

**Frontline view of sanctions**

Economic sanctions include a wide range of possible instruments such as limiting trade, removing investments or banning new investments and ending loans, and measures such as cultural, sports and other boycotts. The impact of each of these on South Africa, its neighbors and the Western countries themselves is very different. It is therefore important not to generalize arguments about the effects of one kind of sanctions to sanctions as a whole.

This is particularly true in respect to the effect of sanctions on the SADCC states. Certain sanctions, such as an investment switch from South Africa to frontline states or restricting foreign credit to South Africa would not pose a direct threat to them. Similarly, banning the importation of South African agricultural products would have little effect because the consequences would be difficult to pass on. For other sanctions it would be easier to pass the

**Table 3**

Estimated Canadian economic links with SADCC countries			
	Imports (\$ millions)	Exports (\$ millions)	Aid Program (\$ millions)
<b>1982</b>	19	89	n/a
<b>1983</b>	49	42	85
<b>1984</b>	33	70	124

Procurements of Canadian goods (but not services) under the aid program are included in, and make up a majority of, exports.

penalty on to some frontline states, for instance a ban on intercontinental flights to South Africa or an oil blockade could easily result in South Africa's refusing to allow on-flights or deliveries to Lesotho, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

Whatever happens, SADCC will need external support as it braces for the coming year. As SADCC itself stated in July:

Those opposed to sanctions argue that they will hurt the neighboring states. Undoubtedly, this is true. But if we accelerated the ending of apartheid, it would be well worth the additional cost.

Of course, the threat that South Africa will try to hurt the economies of the SADCC countries in response to sanctions is real. The biggest danger would be to the transportation of essential goods, such as food and oil, which could be disrupted by closing South African ports to SADCC goods and attacking the alternate routes in Mozambique.

Even so, such options are not as attractive as they were when South Africa's economy was healthier. If it responded to external sanctions in this way, it would be rubbing salt