

new intercontinental strategic weapons may be so highly mobile as to be virtually invisible. This would call into question the ability of either side, or any international body, to verify arms control agreements. You see the paradox. These questions are so intellectually difficult that, too often, the public and their leaders are tempted to leave these problems to experts, to nuclear accountants, to the people who understand the technology, but who do not consider the political dimension of the issue. If missiles stay in one place, the enemy knows where they are, and could destroy them by launching a first strike, so that the side under attack could not respond with an attack of its own. One side would win the war simply by destroying the other's nuclear missiles.

That is why these weapons are destabilizing. You must use them or lose them. For that reason, making these missiles mobile also make them more stabilizing weapons, in the sense that a first strike by the enemy would not destroy them. He would not know exactly where they were and, therefore, he would not start a war, because the other side would still be able to send missiles back at him. That would assure the destruction of both sides, which is not in the interest of the side which might otherwise be tempted to launch a first strike.

But there is a further paradox in the fact that, if these missiles are too mobile, you could not count them, even by using satellites. And if you cannot count them, neither side could verify that the other was respecting the treaties, such as SALT I, and other agreements which might be reached.

Canada continues to devote attention, and resources, to problems of verification which must be resolved if arms-control measures are to be durable and trusted. We believe that the prospects for arms control would be considerably enhanced if the verification factor were taken into account in the developmental stage of any new strategic system — rather than leaving it to the point where systems are put on the bargaining table.

It is therefore my intention to introduce, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate disarmament forum, papers calling for: (a) international agreement to ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems; (b) to restrict excessive mobility of intercontinental ballistic missiles; and (c) to require that future strategic weapons systems be fully verifiable by national technical means. That is to say that the space satellites of each side can see what is being prepared, constructed and developed on the other's territory.

These are measures of substance, often technical in their detail. But if we can generate a political impulse toward a five-power nuclear conference, toward renewed political commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, toward action at the MBFR talks to balance conventional forces and to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe, toward a restriction of qualitative developments in strategic technology, and toward their verification, then we would have motivated a truly global and comprehensive approach to the crisis of peace and security.

It is essential, as I told my colleagues in Europe, that this interlocking program, this safety net for our very survival, be guided by political leadership at the highest level. That our own consultations, and talks with others, be quickened by a jolt of political energy. That we work to identify steadily increasing areas of mutual interest, starting from our common humanity and our common fate on this earth.