

refusal to recognize the Peking regime in its present form as an accepted or acceptable member of the community of nations. There is impatience with any policy based on any other consideration than that of doing everything possible to bring about the disappearance of this dictatorial and dangerous regime.

On the other side, there is a disposition to accept - though without any relish - certain facts of the situation and hope that the processes of normal political and economic evolution will improve this situation and remove some of the dangers inherent in it; will bring about ultimately some measure at least of national respectability. There is the hope that China will gradually absorb Communism as it has absorbed all its foreign bodies over the centuries, and that Mao Tse-tung, if left alone, will become Mao Tes-Tito! To this school, expediency is not immorality, but realism, while moralizing is concerned not so much with principle as with self-delusion.

Those who think like this may take some comfort from Louis Halle's words, in the article to which I have already referred:

"....in the historical perspective the people identify statesmanship with strategic prudence, however much they abhor it in their moments of ideological excitement. Queen Elizabeth never aroused such fervor of approval among her contemporaries as Cromwell did, but history has preferred her example. In the same perspective Abraham Lincoln is morally superior to Carrie Nation."

It is, then, considerations of political strategy as much as, or more than, those of ideology, that have influenced policy in certain countries in our Western coalition; that have caused many of them to recognize diplomatically and to deal with the Communist government of Peking. The plain fact is that governments in these countries do not think their national interests in the Far East are as seriously affected by trying to come to terms with Communist policy in that area as they would be if they ignored and tried to outlaw the regime in Peking. Such governments are more ready, then, to compromise and make adjustments, for what they consider to be their own national advantage. Others are held back from doing so - especially in the field of commercial relations - only by fear of offending the United States and destroying cooperation with her in Pacific affairs, with resultant harmful effects on co-operation elsewhere. These governments tend to become impatient at those who insist that our policy toward Peking should be in essence a crusade against evil. When your own national interests are not immediately and harmfully affected, or your historical and established position forcefully challenged, it seems to be easier to be objective about such things as crusades against communism or colonialism, or any other "ism".