

twice since the end of the Cold War, most recently in June, 1996. These changes were adopted in a climate more secretive and vague than before. Cdr. Green's information on both changes in the doctrine (dubbed MC 400 and MC 400/1, which remains classified) comes largely from off-the-record briefings with anonymous NATO and national officials over the years.

NATO asserts that it will maintain nuclear weapons "for the foreseeable future." They justify their stand by the logic that nuclear weapons play a stabilizing role and prevent the rise of new aggressor states. Although there will be fewer nuclear weapons, those that remain will be deployed in a more flexible way. Cdr. Green said he is perplexed and troubled by the statement from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office that "NATO's strategy of war prevention, including its nuclear element, is essential to the process of forging new relationships with Russia and other East European countries."

As in the past, NATO refuses to rule out a "first strike" or commit to using nuclear weapons only as a "last resort", said Cdr. Green. What has changed is that NATO is developing a new "adaptive targeting capability" allowing for possible targets to be chosen by computer at the last moment. This will make it more difficult to maintain political control over nuclear weapon use under all circumstances.

So called "sub-strategic" nuclear weapons would likely be the ones used for adaptive targeting. Cdr. Green warned against viewing these weapons as more benign than strategic nuclear weapons, stating that a new "low-yield" submarine-based nuclear bomb, for instance, has eight times the yield of the Hiroshima bomb. The indiscriminate nature of these devices means they are not military weapons but militarily useless. "They are delayed action biological terror devices which also explode with devastating power," he said.

What also has changed is NATO's perception of the source of its enemies. Today, the alliance believes its enemies originate from North Africa, and the near- and Middle-East, outside NATO's traditional European terrain.

At this point in his presentation, Cdr. Green focussed on the strategic designs of nuclear powers within NATO, and conveyed his concern about the new bilateral arrangements between the US, UK and France. Cdr. Green believes these might have worrying implications on the non-nuclear NATO member states. In 1992 the UK and France established a Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine. The Commission was driven by the debate on a common European Union security policy and the belief that nuclear capability was essential to the maintenance of Security Council membership. In 1995, the UK and France agreed that they would fire a "low-yield" nuclear warning shot if either's "vital interests" were threatened. The implications being that such a threat could be made even against a non-nuclear state, notwithstanding British and French negative security assurances. The 1995 British Defence White Paper defined these vital interests as sea routes, the supply of raw resources and British investment overseas.

Meanwhile, the United States also advanced an agenda for "nuclear gunboat diplomacy"