

credible. Adoption of a "latent proliferation" approach, which focuses on controlling the spread of a technological capacity to make the weapons in question, raises the question of exports or transfers. Dual-capability materials raise problems for both approaches. For parts of the chemical industry, adoption of a latent proliferation approach might be very difficult because of the widespread availability of chemical plant and materials.

4. To avoid misapplication of effort, misunderstanding, and ill-founded suspicions, there must be clarity about the relationship between the activities of a verification agency and the obligations of states in a control agreement: not all obligations may be covered by the Agency's activities. Beyond that, differing verification objectives may present logical and empirical difficulties, for example, in "verifying compliance" or in "establishing non-compliance." Under INFCIRC/153, the Agency may report if it is "unable to verify that there has been no diversion." In practice this seems to imply that it would report any reasonable fears of diversion. This enlists ambiguity on the side of the Agency rather than against it.
5. The routes to acquiring nuclear weapons or the "threats" covered by the Agency are limited by (a) its definition of the arms control problem in end-use terms; (b) its focus on declared, civilian nuclear activities; (c) its use of two safeguards systems, one item-specific and the other full-scope; (d) its inability to address, including in its distribution of effort, the differing types and levels of political risk of proliferation; (e) its inability to address the different motivations for the acquisition of nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapons capability; and (f) possible differences between the obligations that states assume in non-proliferation agreements and the precise activities covered by its safeguards systems.

Safeguards Character and Effectiveness

1. For a variety of reasons, the Agency applies more than one safeguards system. This complicates its efforts and their results. Some coherence is maintained by efforts to bring its two systems into a closer correspondence (although this has also been resisted), by the development of guidelines for its systems, and by the requirement that the Board of Governors approve safeguards agreements. The Agency is thus not obliged to accept and apply whatever safeguards that states may agree on in a bilateral interstate agreement.