

treaty-limited armaments) — and the units remaining after reductions would be provided separately.

Despite this latest WTO proposal, NATO did not advance the HLTF's December 1986 deadline so it might respond rapidly with its own position on reductions. In fact, it could not. Opposing viewpoints had prevented an early consensus,¹³ and only a last-minute meeting between U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz and French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond produced a compromise before the deadline. This compromise was embodied in the "Brussels Declaration," issued at the foreign ministers' meeting 11-12 December 1986. The Declaration proposed discussions on a new negotiating mandate for conventional arms control covering Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Discussions would take place concurrently within two distinct negotiations — the first building upon the achievement of the Stockholm Conference on confidence and security building measures; the second seeking to eliminate conventional force disparities between NATO and the WTO.

No concrete verification proposals were included; the Declaration itself was a statement of principles rather than a specific negotiating proposal. However, the verification principle underlying NATO's conventional arms control proposals in the past was once again repeated: "an effective verification regime (in which detailed exchanges of information and on-site inspection will play a vital part) [is needed] to ensure compliance with the provisions of any agreement, to guarantee that limitations on force capabilities are not exceeded."¹⁴

Negotiations between NATO and the WTO on a new conventional arms control mandate began 17 February 1987 at the French Embassy in Vienna. While the discussions continued, a new reductions plan was suggested 5 May 1987 by Polish leader Wojciech Jaruzelski in a speech at the second PRON (Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth) Congress. The "Jaruzelski Plan" as it became known contained the following elements:¹⁵

- (1) withdrawal of short-range nuclear missiles, "nuclear-weapon-carrying" aircraft, nuclear artillery and charges (e.g., bombs and mines);
- (2) withdrawal of those weapons most suited to offensive conventional operations — strike aircraft, tanks, armed helicopters, long-range and rocket artillery;
- (3) joint discussions of military doctrines, aimed ultimately at the mutual adoption of strictly defensive doctrines; and,
- (4) agreement on confidence-building measures covering land, naval and air force activities.