

mote are fundamental parts of military behaviour. Of course, it is not efficient or cost-effective, but what military forces are supposed to do is not part of our everyday, cost-effective world. No doubt inter-service rivalry has lost many lives, as well as costing millions of dollars, but I find it hard to believe that accountants would make good generals.

Hellyer's argument for unification is that he was streamlining the Army, Navy and Air Force and turning them into more efficient, modern forces. While he probably was right that the Air Force was extremely unlikely ever to have to play a nuclear role in Europe, he may have missed the point when he wanted to beef-up the F-104's capabilities in conventional warfare. Hellyer thought that "it didn't make sense to have planes sitting helplessly like so many stationary ducks." Actually, that was the role of the Canadian and the American Forces in Europe; they were there to make sure that Washington's commitment to European defence would not vanish during a crisis.

Nevertheless, Mr. Hellyer does begin to understand that the Canadian Armed Forces might have a useful contribution to make. When he discusses the forced withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force from Suez he admits that this was "a 'setback' to the cause of world peacekeeping ... the ideals of the United Nations Charter have been frustrated by the unwillingness of member states to accept restraints on the exercise of national sovereignty implicit in such a system."

Mr. Hellyer strikes one as a tremendously hard worker: he laboured at unification until he wore everybody down (how many tempests in a teapot can anyone bear?). His book has the same doggedness about it – there is a tremendous amount of information, but a lack of clarity about purpose, and effect. – *Tina Viljoen*

Ms. Viljoen is co-author with Gwynne Dyer of The Defence of Canada: In the Arms of the Empire.

**Unauthorized Action:
Mountbatten
and the Dieppe Raid**
Brian Loring Villa

*Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989,
314 pp., \$14.95, paper*

■ The minor resort and port town of Dieppe lies on the French coast facing England. There are literally hundreds of much nicer places in France worth remembering, yet in Canada the name resonates through the collective memory. There are dozens of "Dieppe" avenues across the country in towns and suburbs – incongruously stuck among the "maplewood" and "oak" streets.

The August 1942 raid on Dieppe has always been a puzzle. Of the five thousand soldiers – most of them Canadians – who actually landed on the beach that morning, 2,700 were killed or captured by lunch time. In proportion, this was the costliest Allied expedition of the entire war, and it had, according to the author of this new book – and contrary to the official British record of the event – no discernable military purpose or hope of success.

Dieppe has always been a tribulation not because it was a failure, but because it was not a beautiful failure, nor even a good gamble. It was a botched job from its conception and it should never have happened. The bravery of the Canadian soldiers was wasted. Military historian John Keegan, wrote of it: "Dieppe, in retrospect, looks so recklessly hairbrained an enterprise that it is difficult to reconstruct the official state of mind which gave it birth and drove it forward." In *Unauthorized Action*, Brian Loring Villa attempts that reconstruction, not as a bit of dark conspiracy, but with a view to understanding how the decision to launch the doomed operation got made, why, by whom and "explain why the evidence surrounding the background to the Dieppe raid has become so hopelessly muddled."

Villa's thesis is that Louis Mountbatten, then head of Britain's Combined Operations, and his assistant John Hughes-Hallett, were determined to launch the Dieppe operation against all military logic and in the face of considerable expert opposition

within the senior levels of the British and Canadian military. The operation went ahead anyway, with predictable – and at the time, predicted – results, because of a "corrupt" decision-making apparatus within the British government. The responsible people, from Churchill on down through the British High Command and senior civil service, could have stopped the raid and should have.

Borrowing on the theories in the American political scientist Graham Allison's seminal 1971 study of government decision making, the author constructs a classic case history of "why governments do what they should not do." It is a highly readable and well-documented account from which the British officers most directly implicated in the affair, Mountbatten and Hughes-Hallett, emerge as egregiously flawed individuals. Mountbatten especially, comes off very badly.

My own first recollection of a real war story is of a family friend visiting the house when I was six or seven – some twenty years after he was delivered onto the beach in front of Dieppe port and almost immediately captured by the German defenders. He spent the rest of the war shuttling from one prison camp in Germany to another. What still sticks in my memory of him is his fierce anger and bitterness. His voice was that of a man betrayed – outraged that he could be used by people he trusted in such a foolish way for nothing at all, at least nothing he could discern. If he were alive to read this book, I wonder whether Villa's attempt to answer the question, "why?", would give him some peace of mind.

– *Michael Bryans*

Mr. Bryans is Editor of Peace & Security and co-creator of the NFB film series War.

BRIEFLY NOTED

The Sea Is At Our Gates: The History of the Canadian Navy
Tony German

*Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990,
360 pp., \$39.95 cloth*

■ *The Sea is at Our Gates* recounts the story of Canada's navy

from its colonial roots through the two world wars to the close of the Cold War in 1990. The story presented – the author is a retired Canadian naval officer – is one of "courage and sacrifice at sea ... [and] a proud force scuttled time after time by its political masters."

**The Domestic Battleground:
Canada and the
Arab-Israeli Conflict**

David Taras and
David H. Goldenberg, editors

*Kingston, Montreal: McGill-Queen's
University Press, 1989, 250 pp., \$29.95
cloth*

■ This book examines the domestic politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict and challenges the assumption that the Canadian state is relatively free from domestic pressures when it comes to making foreign policy. The first section describes some of the domestic actors and the policy-making roles they have taken "in the contest over Canada's Middle-East policy." The second looks at the decision making process in Ottawa, and the last section is an overall assessment of Canada's role in the region and initiatives that might be taken in the future. Contributors to this volume include, David Bercuson, University of Calgary; David H. Goldberg, director of Canadian Professors for Peace in the Middle East; John Sigler, Carleton University; and David Taras, University of Calgary.

Avoiding the Brink: Theory and Practice in Crisis Management

Andrew Goldberg et al, editors

*London: Brassey's / Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 1990, 138 pp.,
US \$31.95, cloth*

■ A fairly specialized and scholarly survey of the field of international conflict crisis management, this volume contains chapters by *inter alia*: Joseph Nye on nuclear crisis management; Robert Jervis on psychology and crisis stability; Coit D. Blacker on Soviet approaches to crisis management; and Paul Bracken, Andrew Goldberg and Debra van Opstal on various elements of crisis simulation. □

Reviews of French language publications can be found in the *Paix et Sécurité* "Livres" section.