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It will by this time be known to our readers that the vacancy in the Chancery Division has been filled by the appointment of Mr. Richard M. Meredith, of London. Rumor had given no sound as to who might be a likely recipient of the honor, and the appointment of one but little known outside of his own circuit caused some surprise in legal circles—a surprise which was not lessened by the fact that the Crown had selected a man from the outer bar. This, of course, is not without precedent. But it does appear to be somewhat of an unkind cut to the shoals of gentlemen now wearing silk, that they should all have been passed by and that one of the comparatively few left to the outer bar should have been selected. Possibly none of the newly appointed Q.C.s. would accept a seat on the Bench! The fact is, men in the front rank of the profession cannot be induced to give up their practice for a seat on the Bench. This is a great evil and one which we are surprised the Government takes no means to remedy. There are difficulties doubtless in the way; the French-Canadian question cropping up here, as it does in other ways, where Ontario is concerned. The question, however, must be faced sooner or later, and the sooner the better. We have already in the High Court of Justice a representative of the western metropolis who does it credit, and has proved a most useful and excellent judge. We trust that the gentleman who is now congratulated upon his promotion may be as great a success.

AMONG the judicial deliverances which will hereafter serve as landmarks of the development of constitutional government will be found, we believe, the learned and able judgment of the Chancellor of Ontario, on the case recently submitted to the Chancery Divisional Court, regarding the constitutionality of the Act of the Provincial Legislature (51 Vict., c. 5), vesting in the Lieutenant-Governor the power of pardoning offences against statutes within the competence of the Local Legislature. The learned Chancellor places the prerogative of pardon on this basis, that it is not a mere personal right vested in the sovereign, to be exercised capriciously, but is a necessary constituent element and supplement of the law-making power, wherever that power may be vested by the constitution. From these premises he draws the conclusion, that where the power to make a law is vested, there also resides the power to pardon for breaches of that law, a power to be exercised constitutionally and subject to the advice of ministers responsible to the people. The result therefore is arrived at, that so far as the B.N.A. Act has vested in the Provincial Legislature power to make laws, so far it has also