

for detecting and identifying of underground events. Possibilities of supplementing them are being explored. Canada supports the proposal put forward for this purpose by Sweden, which is that interested countries, primarily those not nuclear powers, should exchange seismic information. The proposed exchanges would take place principally among those countries with a sufficiently advanced seismological science and data-gathering or processing equipment, but results would be available to all. With information coming from many sources, individual countries would be in a better position to assess whether any suspicious underground event was natural or nuclear in origin. We attach importance to the participation of the nuclear powers in the suggested exchange and welcome their expressed interest. If the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., for example, could provide information from sites close to indeterminate events to supplement information now available from distant monitoring, many more nuclear events could be identified.

It has also been suggested recently that the idea of so-called "black boxes" — that is, sealed seismographic installations — could supplement distant means and would make it almost certain that no clandestine testing could be carried out. We should hope that the U.S.S.R. will also agree to co-operate in examining such procedures, which, in combination with others, might make it possible to break the deadlock in the underground test prohibition problem, and permit the successful culmination of the efforts which have been under way since the Moscow Treaty was signed. We have also studied, with much interest, other proposals made by Sweden, Mexico, Brazil and the U.A.R. in an effort to bridge the gap between the positions of the two major powers on this issue. We hope these suggestions will be carefully considered by those principally concerned.

Another proposal which, though not new, commends itself to Canada is to halt the production of fissile material for military purposes, popularly known as the "cut-off". Several nations besides the U.S.A. (which has elaborated proposals in this regard) appreciate that a verified halt in the production of fissile material for use in weapons would reverse the dangerous continual increase in the nuclear potential of nuclear powers. It would be, therefore, an anti-proliferatory measure mainly affecting nuclear powers, and would constitute a "balancing obligation" to the obligations nations without nuclear weapons would incur by signing a non-proliferation treaty. In our view, the cessation of fissile material production should be seriously studied. It combines the quality of not endangering existing national security with the positive values to which I have just referred.

Goal of Total Disarmament

This brings me to the question of general and complete disarmament which has not occupied very much of the time of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in this year's discussions, although it was not neglected entirely in the ENDC. We have