

sand miles wide*. We cannot reasonably suppose that the French would neglect building such forts as soon as such a peace was concluded; their former conduct on the Ohio tells us very plainly that they know their own interest perfectly well, and if we may judge by *our* conduct, much better than we did ours. If a peace had been concluded on the terms offered in the late negotiation they would have had a right to erect these forts, with only getting the consent of the Indians. Now it cannot be asserted that we should not have suffered them, and should have restrained them by a clause in the treaty, because we in the very same article give up our right to do that by saying that these Indians are under our protection, and they are supposed throughout the negotiation to be independent nations. But every quibble, every dispute would have been rectified, had our Minister insisted on the Mississippi being the boundary *of the possessions of the two crowns* in those parts; that river is two or three miles wide in its whole course through these countries: such a boundary could not have been mistook, and by our planting the bank on our side directly, we should soon obtain a thorough knowledge of the whole country, and put it out of the power of the French to *encroach* without *openly invading*.

I have hitherto endeavoured to convince the reader that the peace, had it been concluded on the plan proposed by the British Minister, must necessarily have left our American colonies insecure, although their security was the original end of our entering into the present war. I think I have proved, and from facts, rather than empty reasoning, that this insecurity would have been owing to our not insisting on the Mississippi being made the limit of Louisiana, and our colonies; and I conceive that it will take very little ingenuity to convince the unprejudiced, that the British Minister ought by all means to have insisted on France ceding *all North America* to Great-Britain; and that such a conduct would have been much more wise and more for the interest of his country than keeping a share of the neutral islands, or Senegal and Goree, or even than the East Indies. —Canada is of little or no importance to us; and of none to the French unless connected with Louisiana†; we might have learned this truth long ago, had

* I cannot avoid once for all assuring the reader, that I do not hazard these assertions relating to the extent of the countries in question, without having first examined them in the best maps, with the most scrupulous attention. Without having consulted good maps, no person can speak on the point without making many mistakes.

† “ The truth of the matter is, they were tired of Canada. The inclemency of the climate, the difficult access to it; and a trade scarcely defraying the expence of the colony, would long ago have induced them to abandon it, if the plan of extending its boundaries, at the expence of the English, and of opening its communication with Louisiana and with the ocean, had not made them persevere :