

dered in the common class of adversaries, but as the most dangerous rival ; a rival, whose great extent of power is much to be feared ; a rival, ever vigilant to promote measures that are diametrically inconsistent with our welfare and security ; — a rival, whose interests are, in every respect, incompatible with ours, and whose equality of power with that of our own, is both unnatural and impossible. When I consider, Sir, all these circumstances, can I think such excessive moderation arises from a good cause ? Can you, Sir, think it made out of friendship to yourself or the public ? Let us recollect, Sir, with what ignominy we have treated our negotiators at the treaty of Utrecht, and with what confusion we call to mind the terms of that peace, which, I will not scruple to say, Sir, gained us much larger cessions than are at present recommended by the most zealous and immoderate stickler against France. Gibraltar, Minorca, and Newfoundland, are ever to be esteemed invaluable acquisitions. Besides, Sir, there were several immunities to be granted in favour of our commerce ; the sole property of St. Christopher's was given up ; and Dunkirk was to be effectually demolished, an article then deemed of more consequence than all the rest, and of which no promise or deposit was reckoned a sufficient pledge for the performance : it was given into our possession before any treaty was concluded on. Had our ministry made larger demands, they would certainly have been complied with. They did not omit them upon a pretence of moderation, but because France had no other object worth their asking. We had very little to apprehend from their sugar colonies, or Canada ; the
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