

tariff measures that Japan, in the eyes of the United States, was using to run up its structural surpluses.

Even the unfinished business centred on U.S.-Japan issues: the Japan-U.S. bilateral tariff negotiation and the "safeguards" negotiation, which centred on market disruption by low-cost imports from the developing countries. Addressing safeguards had been an important element of the Tokyo Declaration, and clearly represented an important issue for Japan, which felt targeted by the use of such measures, by the United States in particular.

Generally, the waxing and waning of momentum in the Tokyo Round matched the waxing and waning of revaluation pressures on the yen. None of this is obvious from a uniquely trade policy-centric interpretation of the unfolding of the Tokyo Round; the broader context counted.

The Uruguay Round (1986-1994)

The connection between the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds is evident in a number of ways, including the fact that the latter was much concerned with the unfinished business of the former. Substantively:

- trade in agriculture and the growing area of services trade were still conducted outside the framework of the GATT;
- textiles trade was dealt with in the GATT but in contradiction to its principles;
- a variety of new restraints on trade (e.g., the so-called "grey-area" measures such as voluntary export restraints or VERs) flourished in the early 1980s; and
- the various new codes negotiated in the Tokyo Round had revealed their flaws when put into practice.

There was, accordingly, a ready-made and well-understood trade agenda to be dealt with. From a trade policy perspective, the launch of the Uruguay Round was thus to be a return to trade business as usual in refining and perfecting the rules-based system. The only thing required was for the United States to exercise its customary leadership.