in particular regional contexts (such as the Middle East), they seem to depend on other factors, such as the presence of risk-taking leaders, territorial disputes, cross-border minorities, or internal unrest.

More importantly, the relationship between conflict and military expenditure is logically the "other way around": many researchers have argued that we should expect *conflict*, which has deep and often complex roots, to be the *cause* of changes in levels of military spending. This does receive some confirmation in statistical studies, and both the intensity and duration of conflict does seem to push up levels of military spending. A ratchet effect is also at work: once increased, military spending tends to remain at high levels even after conflicts end or recede.[20] This suggests that analysts need to adopt a more comprehensive view of the relationships at work: if military expenditures do exert a negative impact on economic, social or political development, but are in turn the product of the regional conflict environment, then we should not expect policies directed solely at addressing security spending to be effective. States or regimes concerned with external (or internal) threats, and willing to make sacrifices to survive, are not likely to be convinced to change military expenditures simply because some negative consequences ensue!

Some very general illustrations of the presence or absence of any global or general relationship are shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3 on the following pages. Figure 1 addresses directly the military spending-economic growth linkage. It tabulates military spending as a percentage of GNP (in 1993) against rates of economic growth (per capita GNP) for the period between 1980 and 1993 (where available).[21] The chart is merely illustrative, since one cannot compare or "correlate" the data for one year at the end of a period (military expenditures) against the average for an entire decade, and no attempt to uncover a statistical relationship has been attempted. But if there were a close relationship between the two variables, one would expect the pattern of markers to be high on the left side (high levels of military spending, low or negative growth rates), and dropping as we move to the right, to high-growth economies. There is no such pattern in Figure 1: although some high spenders (such as North Korea, Libya or Saudi Arabia) are economically in crisis (or have suffered negative growth), other high spenders (such as Oman or Pakistan) appear to enjoy relatively strong growth. Likewise, some low spenders have high growth (Indonesia, Mauritius), while others (Ivory Coast, Haiti) have stagnated even without a high military burden. This finding is not surprising, since any relationship would likely be confounded by other variables, such as the economy's resource base, the threat environment, the form of government, or cycles of economic growth.

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and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," *International Studies Quarterly*, 26 (March 1982), 37-51; Paul Diehl, "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look," *Journal of Peace Research*, 20:3 (1983), 205-212.

[20] Robert McKinlay, *Third World Military Expenditure: Determinants and Implications* (London: Pinter, 1989), 82-109.

[21] Obviously, one should use the *average military expenditure percentage* over the same period, rather than the percentage for 1993 to compare with average economic growth. This is done in the regional case studies below.