

(The President)

request seems to be acceptable, I hope that we can dispense with convening an informal meeting to review it. In any case, it will also be considered this afternoon at presidential consultations, where we can dispense with that requirement.

CD/PV.612

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(Mr. Errera, France)

... That is why we attach so much importance to a credible verification system for the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, one likely to deter potential violators and thereby reassure the vast majority of States which abide by their commitments. It is at that price, and only at that price, that the security of States will be guaranteed and hence the universality of the convention will be ensured. And it is that concern that will continue to guide the French delegation until the conclusion of this first world disarmament agreement, whose signature I would remind you, France, as a depository of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and through the voice of the President of the Republic, has proposed at Paris before the end of the year.

3. It is because the vital interests of all States, north and south, are at stake that we attach so much importance to the establishment of strict international controls of non-proliferation and credible multilateral verification of disarmament. This approach does not mean seeking to impose new constraints on developing countries; on the contrary, to our mind, it means responding to their security and development needs; it means contributing to the construction of a juster and safer world. No viable policy can be based on contentment with insufficient, inadequate control and verification regimes, inasmuch as of transfers of technology to the south would become increasingly limited. Such a makeshift solution could only run counter to the interests of the immense majority of the developing countries which, in abiding by the rules of non-proliferation, would find themselves doubly penalized: first, because they would be denied access to the technologies needed for their economic development, and, secondly, because their security would be threatened by those which refuse to enter into binding commitments or which violate the commitments they have entered into. Everything prompts us, on the contrary, to seek together a balance between the necessary strengthening of non-proliferation controls and greater cooperation in transfers of technology with those countries which honour their commitments.