

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The United States shares the concern of many delegations about ensuring undiminished security during the period of transition to a world in which such chemical weapons no longer exist. We believe that the security concerns of all CD participants with regard to this period, as well as after, must be met in order to achieve the universality we seek.

In this regard, it is essential that States be just as candid about their own chemical weapons capabilities as they are quick to criticize those who admit to having them.

The way we see it, there is good news and bad news. There are more than 20 States that have or are seeking chemical weapons. The bad news is that only two States - the United States and USSR - have admitted to having a chemical weapon programme or capability, and some States have even falsely denied it. The good news is that a large number of delegations from States with CW programmes or intentions are present here in this room today and are participating in the CW negotiations, and thus have an opportunity to make a concrete contribution to progress. Here I address myself to the co-ordinators of the regional groups that represent more than 20 chemical-weapon-capable States here in this chamber. When they feel the need to give advice in the name of their groups to the United States and, I imagine, also to the Soviet Union, they should bear in mind, as we do, that they speak also on behalf of at least several CW-capable States.

In addition to the issue of undiminished security, the programme of work for 1990 outlined by the Chairman of the CW Ad hoc Committee lays before us a number of other very important technical and political issues. My delegation will actively participate in the attempt to find solutions to these issues as well.

Work will be taken up on procedures to investigate alleged use, provisions for ad hoc verification and guidelines for initial inspections. With regard to verification of alleged use, Canada and Norway, as well as the United Nations Secretary-General's expert group, have done much good work on this issue. The United States is pleased to hear of both the interest expressed in an ad hoc verification régime and the desire to take up this issue soon. We hope to provide the Conference with a proposal to break the deadlock on this subject in the very near future. With regard to guidelines for initial inspections, a number of CD documents on national trial inspections have highlighted the need for such guidelines. We agree that they are needed and work should be undertaken to develop such guidelines.

The work programme also addresses the order of destruction, technical criteria such as production capacity and thresholds, and guidelines for schedule 1. As noted in the Wyoming joint statement, the United States and Soviet Union have agreed on some procedures governing the order of destruction of chemical weapons negotiations. Our approach will be introduced into the CW negotiations very soon.

The United States has tabled papers on the issues of production capacity and thresholds and has participated in the development of the production capacity paper now in appendix II. We believe this material is a useful basis