

might have tried to work a common approach with, say, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Norway, Mexico, and Brazil.

"One of the ironic things about the San Francisco conference, as far as the Canadian delegation was concerned, is that the three proposals to which we attached great importance, and for which we fought hard and successfully, turned out to be of no importance.

"The first provision we insisted on was that, in the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council, the General Assembly should pay special attention to the capacity of the state to contribute to the purposes of the UN and 'equitable geographical distribution' should be a secondary consideration. It was an example of our belief in the 'functional theory.' The General Assembly paid no attention to this provision of the Charter, so the amendment we got was of no importance.

"We also insisted that, when the Security Council was discussing the use of a member state's armed forces to enforce its decisions, that state should have the right to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the use of its armed forces. This was on the assumption that the clauses in the Charter requiring member states to put armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council would be effective—but they weren't...

"The third was Mike Pearson's campaign for a revisionary conference in 10 years' time. Well, you can always have a revisionary conference, by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. But what is interesting is that Pearson obviously hoped that in 10 years' time—in 1955 or so—it might be possible to get a stronger UN; whereas in fact, after the Korean War, the Berlin blockade and all the tensions in Europe, it would not have been possible to get a United Nations as strong as the one established at San Francisco.

"Am I depressed by the shortcomings of the United Nations in these 40 years? I think I am depressed. Just take one international dispute that has never been resolved: Kashmir. I may be wrong, but it is my impression of our ideas at San Francisco that, on an issue such as Kashmir, the Security Council would go through all the motions of conciliation and mediation between India and Pakistan and, finally, if they could not reach an agreement, the Security Council would state what it considered should be the future of Kashmir. Then, if one or both of them did not agree, the Security Council would threaten the use of force to impose a settlement. This was not done in Kashmir, and has not been done in Palestine.

"Sometimes I have the feeling that, when the powers immediately concerned cannot—in a dispute such as Kashmir or Palestine—reach an agreement, they would welcome an imposed settlement. It would be like settlements imposed during the 19th century by the Concert of Europe: the leaders of the Concert of Europe could impose a settlement without actually using force, without armies marching....

"The United Nations has been more successful than we anticipated in speeding up the independence of colonial territories, and certainly it has done more than we contemplated at San Francisco in North-South relations. I don't think people then contemplated the importance of this issue."