

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding brief survey has identified a number of Arctic arms control proposals deemed worthy of further serious consideration. It has suggested that Arctic-wide NWFZ agreements, as well as broader demilitarization schemes, are, on the whole, probably not worth pursuing any further at this time. A truly comprehensive scheme of demilitarization such as applied to Antarctica is simply not feasible in the northern polar region, given the scale of military activities already underway there. Since most existing proposals for Arctic arms control concern some kind of nuclear weapon-free zone, the bulk of the paper has been devoted to a discussion of this concept, both in its sub-regional manifestation (the Nordic NWFZ proposal), and in various proposed Arctic-wide variants. While primary emphasis has been placed on the *feasibility* (or more precisely, the lack thereof) of such schemes as applied to broad areas of the Arctic, their very *desirability* has also been challenged. Just as one must distinguish between various kinds of conventional military activities in the area — virtually all advocates of Arctic arms control, for example, heartily endorse the continued operation of early-warning facilities and other limited forms of surveillance, if only to verify compliance with whatever measures of arms control are agreed to — so must one distinguish between various kinds of *nuclear* weapons systems and related installations. In particular, the continued, or even expanded, presence of ballistic missile-carrying submarines in the region should be positively welcomed, rather than deplored, in the interests of overall strategic stability. It is important, however, that such vessels are kept a certain distance away from the coasts of potential adversaries, so as to reduce their first-strike potential and at the same time alleviate the