

that, given the timeframe under present consideration for CW destruction, the number of technologies readily available would be very limited. The destruction of CW stockpiles will mainly be based on the well-established and proven technologies of chemical degradation and incineration.

It was noted that for the destruction of the various types of CW different technologies could be appropriate. Detailed knowledge of the specific problems involved would be crucial in finding the technological response appropriate in any particular case.

Irrespective of the destruction technology adopted, the planning, the construction of facilities and the destruction itself were perceived as highly complex and costly tasks which require long leadtimes.

VI - VERIFICATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

The determination of when the destruction of a CW can be considered as complete (or irreversible in practical terms) was identified as an important subject of further discussion in the CD. In this context, encasement in concrete blocks or other matrices was mentioned.

As far as technical verification requirements under the future chemical weapons Convention are concerned, little if any problems seem to exist. Even for destruction operations designed in the past, without regard to such requirements, an overlay of verification would not have caused major alterations in the design. However, it was considered very useful if, in the planning of destruction facilities, aspects of future verification could already be taken into account.

It was also concluded that the respective provisions of the rolling text have been sufficiently elaborated. To ensure the integrity of declared stockpiles, seals and measuring instruments could be installed and extensive use of records made during inspections.

One problem connected with sample-taking at CW storage sites on the request of inspectors, as provided for in the rolling text, was identified by the United States. It was suggested that the respective provisions be harmonized with national law. While U.S. environmental regulations preclude any release of toxic chemicals from sampling, individual States have jurisdiction over stringent safety standards. Sampling would only be feasible at certified destruction facilities.

As a consequence, containment, sealing and tagging of munitions selected by inspectors are required prior to transport to a destruction facility. Ongoing studies on non-destructive identification techniques necessary for the assessment of recovered old CW, were thought to be of great importance in this context.