

holding of territory. They must be reduced and limited, with equal numbers on each side. As well, we will propose limits on the quantity of those armaments held by any one country, both on its own territory and stationed on the territory of others. No one country should be permitted to dominate Europe by force of arms.

A critically important aspect of these negotiations will be agreement on effective verification measures. Acceptance of verification of compliance as an essential element in the arms control and disarmament process has been formally registered through the adoption of consensus resolutions at the UN General Assembly.

Arms control verification has its own distinct and specific characteristics. It is not equivalent to unilateral monitoring by national means. Neither can it be equated to the observation of unilateral measures under conditions determined by one or more countries without benefit of negotiation. Real verification measures must be a product of negotiation. They must be acceptable to, and equally applicable to, all parties to an agreement. International experience with the negotiation and implementation of such verification measures is still scarce. However, in the bilateral area, the INF agreement is pointing the way, and multilaterally, the implementation of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures under the Stockholm Agreement is providing valuable experience.

Here in Vienna, our negotiators must draw on their experiences in both bilateral and multilateral contexts to develop an effective verification régime, capable of providing confidence in compliance. It will not be sufficient to work toward agreement on reduction measures and subsequently to attempt to devise verification provisions. It will be necessary to examine closely the verification implications of all proposals under negotiation to ensure that compliance with agreements reached can be verified.

A meaningful verification régime will have to be built on a variety of techniques. On-site monitoring, surveillance from space and from aircraft and chal-


lenge inspections will probably all have to be used. We were, therefore, much encouraged by Mr. Shevardnadze's statement that in these negotiations there is no verification measure that the USSR would not be ready to consider and accept on the basis of reciprocity.

In Canada, we will devote considerable resources to this aspect of the negotiations; we have in the past shared the results of our research with the international community. We hope that other nations will devote similar efforts to these important issues. In both negotiations, Canada will be active in devising means to ensure the reliable verification of any agreement.

The proposals that Canada and its Allies will put forward are, in our view, realistic. They will require important changes, not just in the deployment of conventional forces but in our thinking about how peace and security can best be preserved and strengthened in Europe. They will require an unprecedented willingness to draw aside the veil of secrecy which often obscures military operations. The proposed changes are possible and workable. They involve reasonable steps which will further reduce mistrust and the risk of miscalculation. We must now get down to the hard work involved in translating these proposals into agreed measures which, as the Foreign Minister of Poland has just said, will strengthen the security of all.

Today, a growing sense of optimism exists about East/West relations. There is a sense that the world has entered one of those special, if infrequent, period in the history of states when political will and imagination can fruitfully be brought to bear on previously intractable problems. Let us seize this opportunity to redeem the reputation of our century for unprecedented destructiveness and bloodshed. Let us devote all the energies and resources at our disposal to building a genuine and stable security framework for Europe and North America in the 21st century. As a Minister of my Government, as a concerned citizen and as a mother, may I say that we owe no less to our ancestors and to our children." ■

Diplomatic Appointment



Mr. David Peel, Canadian Ambassador to the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna.

The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, recently announced the following diplomatic appointment:

Mr. David Peel from Truro, Nova Scotia, as Ambassador to the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe beginning in Vienna in March.

Mr. Peel (BA, 1954; LLB., Dalhousie University, 1957; Doctorate de l'Université de Paris en droit international public, 1959) joined the Department of External Affairs in 1959. He has served abroad as Second Secretary in Ankara from 1961 to 1963; as Second Secretary in Madrid from 1963 to 1966; as First Secretary in Prague from 1966 to 1968; as Counsellor in Moscow from 1972 to 1974; as Ambassador in Prague from 1981 to 1984. In Ottawa, he was Secretary, Visits Panel Eastern European Division from 1968 to 1972; Deputy to the Chairman, Policy Analysis Group from 1974 to 1975; Deputy Director, Legal Advisory Division from 1975 to 1977; Director, Industry, Investment and Competition Policy Division from 1977 to 1981; Director General, Economic Intelligence Bureau from 1984 to 1985. He was Director General, International Security and Arms Control Bureau from 1985 to 1988 and since that time has been Adviser on Conventional Arms Control. He is married to Diana Roberts. They have two children. ■