

the occasion arises. The Germans, accordingly, aim at raising all officers to such a standard of efficiency that the General in command may be equally confident of being well served at every point of the field under his control, and may be able to devote his attention entirely to his special duties as the commander of the whole Force. The officer commanding an Army Corps is only concerned to give orders to his Generals of Division, and they in turn are only concerned with the officers immediately below them. In Germany, *maîtres-de-camp* are not seen incessantly galloping across the field with orders and counter-orders. Each man knows his place, and receives his orders directly from those immediately above him. This system, which is evidently the ideal of management, is, however, only possible under a rigorous appreciation of those necessities of active warfare of which we have already spoken. Officers who are thus to be left to themselves on any emergency must be always efficient, and for this purpose two conditions are essential. The first is that they must be always studying their profession, and qualifying themselves, step by step, for the successive advances of responsibility which may be thrown upon them. This, accordingly, our Correspondent describes as the cardinal principle of the Prussian Army. The idea of the military profession being one of mere drill and fighting has been banished by them from every rank. Drill is strict, and extends, as our Correspondent has described, to so complete an imitation of the reality that rallying is practised amid the confusion of a *Cavalry mêlée*; but intelligence, reflection, scientific and historical knowledge are equally indispensable qualifications in an officer. This condition, however, could hardly be enforced without another which bespeaks still more the atmosphere of actual service. An incompetent officer is ruthlessly superseded. In our peaceable atmosphere there is no end to the remonstrances which are heard whenever an officer has been debarred from some post to which, in the natural course of seniority, he would have succeeded. Mere selection was, a little time ago, declared on high authority to be impracticable. What would be said among us to a system of seniority tempered by rejection? That, however, is of necessity the rule in time of war, and the Germans, with equal wisdom and justice, make it the rule, in what they regard as merely a time of preparation for War, or Peace. It is something little short of criminal to expose the lives of hundreds and thousands of men to danger rather than hurt the feelings of a single officer, and it is cruel to wait till actual War exposes his inefficiency. German officers consequently hold their commissions on as precarious a tenure in Peace as on the battle-field; and every man throughout the Army knows that if he would retain his place he must qualify himself in accordance with the newest standard of military knowledge. The General Staff, at the head of the whole Force, is engaged, not merely in sustaining, but in perpetually elevating this standard. Its members accumulate, year by year, all new and old information on the art and practice of War, and it is their business to see that there is not an enterprise the Army could be called on to undertake to-morrow for which the requisite information would not be ready. We have a germ of such a Staff in our recently created Intelligence Department, but it is at present on the tentative Peace scale of the other parts of our administration.

It is well that our deficiency in points like these should be forcibly urged upon us. However economical we may deem it right

to be in the general scale of our armaments, it is the most foolish parsimony to grudge expenditure on Departments which in any emergency are the motive and directing power of the whole. If we dismantle our ships, let us at least take care that the engines do not rust. An Intelligence Department and a thoroughly efficient body of officers cannot be created on the spur of a critical occasion, and there is no reason why in this respect we should be behind Prussia and Germany. That portion of our Forces at least may well imagine themselves always at war and be perpetually preparing for it, while the comparatively small numbers of rank and file which we maintain should be, if possible, even more thoroughly exercised than the larger Forces of the Continent. With respect, however, to our military system as a whole there are other considerations to be taken into account. The reader will not fail to observe from our Correspondent's letters some intimation of the price the Prussians and Germans in general pay for being thus constantly in military order. How would our young men like to be draughted into the ranks by wholesale for three years' service for a pay of 9s. a month, from which the Government deducts nearly 4s. for a meagre ration? What would the inhabitants of our country villages say to having regiments and corps quartered on them at the pleasure of the military authorities? What is the cost to a young doctor who, after spending three or four years in the study of his profession, has to abandon it and submit to a year's service in the ranks? The real cost of this system is not calculated, and is, in fact, incalculable; but if it were seen as distinctly as it must sooner or later be felt in Germany, the first sentiment of admiration inspired by the mere military spectacle would be considerably qualified. The Germans, we are told, cannot understand our system of subjecting the Army to civilian control. The proper reply is that we, in our turn, cannot understand their contentment with a system which subjects the whole population to military control. From a merely military point of view there may be much to be said against our hybrid organization; but the difference between ourselves and the Prussians is that we refuse to regard this matter from an exclusively military point of view. The Secretary for War is simply the embodiment of our conviction that the Army, like all other branches of the national life, must be controlled by the Legislature, with due regard to the rights of other branches and of the whole nation. To borrow the illustration our correspondent quotes, we think it necessary to do with the Army what the Prussians just now think it necessary to do with the Church. We acknowledge that we have much to learn from the Prussians in military matters, but the day perhaps will come when they will recognize that they may learn something from us in civil matters. A nation cannot permanently be transformed into an army."

ENGLAND has to thank its late Government for the following complications—"The Inducement Bill" of which Lord Chief Justice Cockburn says, it is probable the legal profession will understand the mode of procedure in a few years—the Reconstruction of the Navy with the result that no one knows what the naval strength of the country or its resources really and truly are, and of which a leading Journal speaking on this wise:

"The *Pall Mall Gazette*, after remarking that no single authority, except perhaps the

Admiralty officials past or present, will undertake to say that our ships are even approximately what they ought to be, either as regards numbers or efficiency or equipment, goes on to observe there was a time when it would have been necessary to prove to the taxpayer that he would be acting wisely in providing additional money for naval purposes, and the process would have been rendered needlessly hard by the faults of our system of taxation. Those faults have now been removed. Without attributing absolute perfection to our fiscal arrangements, it is but fair to say that they do not cripple any considerable industry or harass any important interest or bear harshly on any large class of persons. With the faults of the system have disappeared, as we believe, all traces of unwillingness to bear reasonable burdens for great public ends. There is no longer any need, therefore, to insist upon the prudence of incurring against future risks or upon the folly of spending ten millions annually in making our navy something less than efficient, and withholding the extra million or two which would make it genuinely efficient. The persons who have to be convinced on this point are the Government of the day. No matter which party is in power, there seems to be an equal dislike to spend money upon the highest object on which English money can be spent—the making England safe at home and dreaded abroad. The Liberals have fallen into the habit of making economy the first quality of statesmanship. The Conservatives, who do not particularly care for economy for its own sake, are terribly afraid of tying themselves open to the charge of disregarding it. Will not the Government try the experiment of telling the country plainly what are the shortcomings that must be supplied in order to make the navy efficient; how much money it will take to supply them, and by what means it is proposed to raise that money? We feel sure that the assent to such an appeal would be unmistakable. No Opposition would take the responsibility of overthrowing a Government whose only sin was that they had frankly revealed the weakness of the country, and asked to be allowed to make it strong. Even if the assent imposed a heavy additional burden upon the community we shall still be quite at ease as to its being given; but as a matter of fact there is not the least reason to imagine that the burden imposed would be heavy. Ironclads are not built in a day, and, however large might be the necessary additions to the fleet, the cost of them must necessarily be spread over several years. In all probability the natural increase of the revenue during that period would be fully sufficient to defray the whole of the increased outlay. England would regain her old position on the seas without either new taxes or new loans."

To this is to be added the re-organization of the army which was heroically effected with such a total disregard of personal and public interest as to compel another leading Journal to give utterance to the following:

"The *Morning Post* observes that of all the measures proposed and intended apparently to be carried into effect by the late Minister of War, by far the most important, as regards the practical working of the army, was the plan of relieving regiments on foreign service by their linked battalions from home, and of maintaining them while abroad by drafts from those battalions and from the brigade depots, which were to be common to both corps. Among other prospective advantages, it was asserted by the promoters