

covered by that splendid charge would have been thus permanently held, the guns secured, and a salient point 800 yards in advance, and on a crest in the centre of the enemy's position, gained. The Mounted Riflemen thus thrown forward could have been reinforced, in less than ten minutes, by their own infantry, and in the meantime the returning Cuirassiers and Uhlans, retiring round both flanks under cover of their fire, and reforming as second line behind them in security, would have been an intermediate support. Their heavy losses in retreat, principally sustained from rifle fire, would have been avoided.

"Again supposing one half the 12,000 German cavalry present, or about the number that played a comparatively passive part had been employed, in dismounted action, against Bazaine's weak point, between the Bois des Ognons and the Bois de Vaux, above Gorge, and threatening his communication with Metz, is it not probable that they would have brought his forward march to a standstill just as effectually and at half the loss of life, as by the fearfully costly charges made on his front?

"I do not presume to put forward these questions as any speculative opinions of my own; but having had the advantage of discussing the subject, on the ground itself and just after the battle, with General Sheridan—an eye witness of the fight, and certainly the greatest living authority as to what Mounted Riflemen can do—I think it right to make public the conclusions he formed on the spot, only wishing that I could express them as forcibly or as lucidly as he did. These are questions that are occupying some of the keenest and most practical minds in the German Army at this moment. The opinion seems universal that an intermediate arm to act as above indicated in combination with cavalry, is a technical necessity to be brought on by breech-loading fire.

"Though the German Horse, in the complete demoralization after Wœrth, were able to ride all over the country, a few Uhlans accepting the submission of large cities like Nancy, and carrying terror everywhere, as soon as the Franc-Tireur movement became serious, this was stopped short at once. Under a little rifle fire from woods and hedgerows this free riding was paralyzed; no cavalry patrol could move without some Jagers, generally in a cart, to take care of it. Uhlans and even Cuirassiers felt themselves at a disadvantage, and armed themselves with the Chassepot whenever they could. The inference from this impulse of self preservation is a safer guide than any tactical theory.

"The disasters of the splendid French cavalry further point the moral of the helplessness of the *arme blanche* against breech loaders. Their magnificent Cuirassiers, brave and devoted as in the best days of the First Empire, were destroyed in headlong charges against infantry, without the slightest result. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 8th, and 9th Regiments of that arm at Wœrth; the 5th and 6th at Mouson on the 20th of August; the Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville, or nine out of their eleven Cuirassier Regiments, were literally thrown away, in hopeless efforts under a false tactical system. In the same way the brigade composed of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique were annihilated at Sedan, without even breaking through the infantry whom they charged. The German fire partly of skirmishers, partly delivered in line, destroyed them at 150 yards. Only a few individuals ever reached the bayonets, there to be shot

down or captured. How invaluable to France might have been even this one brigade alone, which carried a long rifle and had been trained to fight on foot, if it could have survived to be used against the long German lines of communication in Nov. and Dec. By that time the French cavalry no longer existed. What even might 2,000 horsemen have effected if handled as Sheridan or Stuart, of Confederate fame, would have used them, when the siege train was on its slow way to Paris? How would it have fared with the rails and tunnels of the long miles to the frontier if the French had read the teachings of the American War as to cavalry aright?

"To look in another direction Russia has thoroughly adopted the Mounted Rifle idea. The Cossacks of the Imperial Guard were told, after a great review some twelve months ago, that they were henceforth to carry a rifle and work on foot. Already 42,000 breech-loaders has been issued to the Cossacks. Let it be remembered that Russia possesses over 200,000 of those light horsemen. When next we meet them, be it in Afghanistan or on the Danube, it will be as carefully trained Mounted Infantry that their excellent qualities will be utilized.

"For us this question is of more importance than to any other nation. Could we put 6,000 sabres in the field? And where are our cavalry reserves, of men or of horses for this handful? All the more urgent that we should not throw away a single man or horse whom we cannot replace, by adherence to an exploded practical theory. If we had 72,000 cavalry like Germany it would be different. Lastly this is the only way to bring out the real value of our Yeomanry. No country in the world is so suited as England for dismounted rifle action, because no other has such features of ground, where at every mile you find a crest on which riflemen can act in position under cover, while their horses are sheltered, close at hand, to the next hollow. The Yeomanry are coming out this year. Why should not a beginning be made with them? We have now an officer at the Horse Guards, better qualified than anyone else to give the details. Colonel Jenyns, C. B., Assistant Adjutant General, late 13th Hussars, trained his whole regiment to act in this way in Canada, in 1867-68."

The *Times* has the following remarks upon the above:—

A question of much interest and no slight importance to our military organization will be found discussed by an able correspondent in our Outer Sheet this morning. A first glance at the subject might well induce a non professional reader to think the problem an easy one, but it requires an exact and peculiar discrimination of objects and duties to place the matter in its proper light. Briefly stated, the question is, How to provide our Army with Mounted Riflemen? Now, as we have already some thousands of mounted troops under the name of Cavalry, what, it may be asked, is needed beyond providing those troops with rifles? To this answer is that as cavalry they would be spoiled by the process, and would not be Mounted Riflemen after all; horse soldiers and foot soldiers fight with different arms, are differently trained, and acquire different ideas of action. A man taught to use a rifle and to rely upon it would no longer be competent to make good use of a lance or a

sabre; so that while we should not get our Mounted Riflemen we should lose our Hussars. Cavalry as such, will be wanted in future wars as much as ever, and the proper efficiency of that branch of the service must not be impaired. Then, why not put infantry on horseback? That no doubt, is what in some way or other should be done; but this expedient also is attended with difficulty. Mounted Infantry are exceedingly apt to degenerate into indifferent cavalry. There is a strong, almost irresistible tendency in that direction, and a good foot soldier would assuredly endeavor to become more or less of a Dragoon. We cannot, however afford to damage our infantry. They must still be what they are, only, if practicable, with the means of moving more rapidly from one point to another.

By this time perhaps, the nature of the problem will be a little clearer. It is not required to train cavalry to fight on foot with the arms of foot soldiers, for that would only be spoiling them for their own work without obtaining from them any good work of another kind. Neither is it sought to teach infantry to fight on horseback; for that, as we have said would be to the detriment of their proper discipline and duty. The object is simply to constitute some method of rapid locomotion for the ordinary marching power of troops. Napoleon, it was said won his battles as much by the legs as by the arms of his soldiers, and the object is now to provide as it were, our soldiers with artificial legs, so as to enable them to keep up with cavalry and artillery. It is not necessary to organize any great numerical force for this purpose. A few companies of infantry available for such duties at the proper time would often be sufficient, and it will probably occur to the reader that there is an alternative which would secure the object in view without even exposing the troops to the temptations of equestrian service. During the Fenian outbreak in Ireland soldiers were commonly carried on the jaunting cars of that country, and so moved about from place to place at twice their usual marching speed without fatigue or inconvenience. Why, then, should not a company or two of "carmen" be organized in conjunction with Mounted Riflemen? Commodious cars might soon be provided from our carriage departments, and a couple of horses well managed, would take a load of eight men, with their arms and ammunition over a considerable distance. It is not supposed, apparently, that cars should be exclusively employed. They would, on the contrary, be attended by a certain percentage of horsemen, but all the troops would dismount and act together.

In an elaborate memorandum on the subject which has been prepared for submission to our military authorities, some curious suggestions are made towards neutralising the solutions of cavalry drill and practice. The men selected for the new training are on no account to be allowed the use of spurs, or indeed, any article of cavalry attire, except leggings. They must invariably dismount to fight, and employ their horses for riding only. They must be selected from infantry regiments, or if from other branches of the service, the candidates must have previously joined some infantry regiments for a period of three months and gone through a course of musketry instruction. The latter stipulation conveys, in fact the essence of the whole problem. In reality, the term "Mounted Riflemen" no longer carries the meaning which it had thirty years ago. All our soldiers—that is to say, all our foot soldiers—are now Riflemen alike