

and hoarding up of property. We do not see that his will-power in that direction is strongest, though mind and will may be correspondingly weak in other respects. On the other hand, look at him whose chief desire and delight consists in doing good to others—in exercising benevolence—and we find that his strongest will-power lies in the prosecution of that object. He may be weak and inefficient in his faculty of accumulating property, and we, invariably, find his will-power in that direction, correspondingly weak. In the case of the murderer, the thief, or the libertine, we find the same invariable facts and correspondences; nor are these facts confined to the human, but are apparent among the lower animals as well. Take the tiger for instance, and compare its character with that of the rabbit, or the hawk with that of the dove. The comparative anatomist on comparing their brains and skulls, finds the same difference in shape, etc., as the animals exhibit in their characters. The hare has little will-power in the presence of danger, except the will to run away, while the tiger has the strong desire and will to grapple with his antagonist and destroy. The hog is said to be a "wilful brute,"—to have a strong will, such as it is—and "as contrary as a black hog," is a proverbial saying, also "as docile as a lamb." From this it will be seen that much intellect is not a necessary concomitant of strong will-power. Mules and jackasses also have the reputation of possessing a very respectable apportionment of that commodity which we are attempting to discuss and explain. Thus we see that Will exists in the lower animals, and in different degrees and manifestations. The same docile sheep, in other respects so destitute, apparently, of Will, in the preservation and defense of her offspring will show most decided will-power. Here is, apparently, a contradiction but only apparently. Why does she? The explanation is simple. The maternal feeling is strong—that portion of the brain being large—and hence the strong desire or will to protect her offspring, even at the expense of her own safety. The timid and shrinking woman, with perhaps, little will-power in other respects, will, under certain circumstances, manifest extraordinary will-power in saving her child. Every one has seen instances of this kind. The explanation is the same. All these facts which might be multiplied and amplified indefinitely, go to show that Will is *not a specific and single faculty, separate from the mind, but is identical with the mind, and an essential part of the mental faculties.* They go to show that will-power may be strong in some respects and weak in others, in the same individual, which is inconsistent with the other hypothesis. The facts and phenomena of human experience can be explained satisfactorily on no other basis yet advanced. The old systems of mental philosophy utterly fail to deal with them. The science of Mind brought to light and taught by Gall, Spurzheim, Combe, Mann, Caldwell and others, being founded upon demonstrable organic conditions, is, without doubt, fundamentally true, (notwithstanding the imperfect condition of its literature, as yet) and is destined to supersede all the old systems. Its nomenclature is different, its methods are different, and its conclusions are widely different. It is now being accepted in its first principles by many of the foremost thinkers. Its fundamental principles are, that the brain is the organ of the mind, that the mind consists of a plurality of faculties, that the different faculties of the mind are dependent upon different portions of the brain for their manifestations, that size of brain, or portions of it, other conditions being equal, is the measure of the fundamental power of the different faculties.

Having thus seen what the Will is, its freedom will be next considered. As already shown the theological assumption of the freedom of the Will, is warranted by neither Kant's system nor Locke's—the Intuitionist nor Experiential School of Philosophy. Further still, from lending such warrant or aid (which will be shown in the next article) is the system of Gall and Spurzheim, which, however, in some of its principles, approximates the Experiential philosophy, and is to that extent included by it.

(To be Continued.)

In our eyes belief has no worth if it be not gained by the reflection of the individual.—Renan.

RENAN ON PRAYER.

TRANSLATED BY J. L. STODDARD, IN BOSTON "INDEX."

I do not object to prayer as a mystic hymn. Every act of admiration, of joy, and of love is in this sense a prayer. But selfish prayer, the prayer by which a finite being seeks to substitute his will for that of the Infinite Being, this I reject, and hold it to be even a sort of insult offered (no doubt innocently) to the Deity. In primitive ages, when a hero was devoured by a cancer, he was believed to be eaten by a god. Fresh meat was therefore offered to the Deity on the supposition that he would prefer this to the flesh of the sufferer, as would leave him. In a somewhat similar way the unscientific man believes that there are supernatural beings acting directly in the affairs of the world, from whom he may obtain by means of supplication an action conformable to his desires. But that such supplication has ever been followed by its desired effect has never been proven. The Greek philosophers saw this perfectly. One of them, Diagoras of Melos, to whom some one pointed out the offerings of the sailors in a temple of Neptune, remarked: "THEY COUNT THE SAVED, BUT NOT THE DROWNED WHO, NEVERTHELESS, HAD MADE VOWS LIKE THE OTHERS!" How admirably said! Yes, in such matters one only takes note of the favorable cases; the sponge is passed over those which do not accord with the illusions which one wishes to indulge in. This is the explanation of all miracles. A prayer is in reality a request for a miracle, since he who prays solicits the Deity to change for his advantage the course which Nature would otherwise follow.

The sick man who prays to recover, when, according to the natural order of things he must die, asks for a miracle. The peasants who make their processions in order to secure rain, or to cause it to cease, in reality request a miracle. They ask that rain may fall at a moment when naturally it would not fall, an event which would require for its accomplishment an utter evolution in the state of the atmosphere. A copious rain in the month of June depends upon phenomena which took place in the month of May amid the icebergs of the north pole. The Deity must, therefore, have known a month beforehand the prayer which were to be addressed to him; he must have turned his attention to the action of the icebergs, and either interfered in their formation or prevented the ice of the pole in its southerly advance from having its ordinary effects in the chilling and condensation of vapors. What is this, if not a miracle?

In order that the wide-spread belief in prayer should be well-founded, it would first be necessary to prove some cases where prayer has been efficacious, that is to say, where prayer has caused events to follow a different course from the one which they would have followed without it. Now such a proof has never been given and never will be. People have prayed ever since the beginning of the world; but we have no proof that a prayer or a vow has ever been answered. Nearly three thousand Carthaginian inscriptions, bearing a close resemblance to each other, have been recently exhumed. On each one of these some pious Carthaginian tells us that Tanith and Baal-Hammon have heard his prayer, in proof of which he has erected this little votive tablet. Very well; but Tanith and Baal-Hammon are false gods! No one any longer admits that they were able to grant the favor sought. The three thousand inscriptions of Carthage attest a mistake. Heaps of votive tablets cannot therefore be considered as a proof that a prayer has ever been answered. Even though the mass of a population should believe that they had experienced the efficacy of prayer, that would prove nothing. The Carthaginians claimed to have experienced the same efficacy, and were deceived, for their gods, as every one will now confess, were powerless.*****

The absence of supernatural intervention is seen in the events of history. The most pious and Orthodox nations are often beaten by the less pious and less Orthodox, without the faintest proof that a superior providence has favored any other party than the most courageous and the strongest. The pretended god of armies is always on the side of the nation which has the best artillery and the best generals.

Nature shows in her government an absolute indifference to right or wrong. The sun rises equally upon the evil and the good. There is not then a single fact that leads us to believe that there exists outside of humanity finite beings capable of acting on our planet. This does not mean that no intelligent and active beings exist outside of humanity; but it does mean that such beings do not extend their action as far as our planet.

For, if such a strange action existed, we should recognize it. Let us suppose some ants established their republic in a very solitary place, where man would only pass two or three times in a century. Let us furthermore suppose that these ants are able to arrive at a knowledge of some of the laws of Nature, but are not capable of understanding the enormous beings who, from time to time crushes them. Their natural philosophy would resemble ours; but they would be obliged