

PEDAGOGY.

AT a recent session of the Academy of Moral and Political Science, Mr. Gréard read a short article on "Pedagogy" which he defined as a science founded on psychology. Mr. Courcelle Seneuil contested that definition. For him, pedagogy, in common with all the so-called moral sciences, is only an art. On that occasion Mr. Ravaisson presented the following observations: In distinguishing art from science, it is not necessary to separate them. The artist whom all agree in considering the greatest of modern times, and who has studied into the nature of art more profoundly than any one else, viz., Leonardo da Vinci, has said, "To paint without a theory, is to sail without a rudder." Pedagogy, the art of education, should also, then, be founded upon a science. Is that science psychology? Perhaps it would be better, in a more general manner, to say philosophy, as to speak of psychology only might lead to the neglect of that which should surpass everything else in the soul, the *nescio quid divinum* which is precisely that which should be the first consideration of true pedagogy. There is something in childhood which surpasses anything in later years, which makes its chief charm, which merits the respect which was claimed for it of old, and which justified the words: "Except ye become as one of these, ye cannot enter into the Kingdom of Heaven." That something is an inward disposition, the origin of sociability, which raises us above that "Me" which Pascal called "odious." That inward disposition attests its presence within us by a principle resembling that which the ancients called the "genius" of

each, and to which they desired each one to render a religious worship because it appeared to be something within us higher than ourselves, *Est Deus in nobis*. It is necessary, says Pascal in an analogous sense, "to love a being which is in us, and which is not yet ourselves." If he had been specially interested in the pedagogical theory, he would doubtless have said that that universal something which is in us is that by which we are capable of charity, that which heads the list of virtues, and which, therefore, education should keep principally in view. Thus we would be lifted above the base idolatry of self. The highest part of philosophy is that which belongs to the treatment of divine things. It should then be philosophy's noblest part to elevate pedagogy. The ancients, from whom we have derived the word pedagogy, had a very concise idea of the aim of education, which was, that it should be a preparation for public life. Among them were two entirely different classes, slaves and freemen, and for these the problem of education was very different. To instruct a slave was to teach him the special trade which he was to use for the general profit, and beyond that nothing was expected of him. To instruct a free man was to prepare him for a free life, that is to say that he should cover with all of his faculties a range vastly wider than that of a personal egotism, or of strictly material interests. There should be long years in which he should not be spared, says Plato. And do we not see, in all nature, that the most important results require longest preparation? Here is then the question of a culture which the human soul should achieve, and which has its duration and its