

large extent on fear of the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union. It was heavily influenced, he is convinced, by the deeper forebodings felt in United States government departments, in Congress and in the White House. The Canadian response to the emerging Cold War and the subsequent association with NATO enhanced our sense of "psychological dependence" upon the United States, Denis Smith asserts. He regards this condition as a major Canadian weakness. He was led to this conclusion, he confesses, by his 1973 biography of Walter Gordon, *Gentle Patriot*. Smith describes his study of Canada and the Cold War as "post-revisionist" history. Fortunately it does not exhibit the polemical and hysterical strain that marked so many of the earlier studies in this genre. Its shading is more subtle, even if its conclusions are no less damaging to received views on the subject. These have been largely, Smith says, the "satisfied rationalization" of the diplomats who participated in the events and then wrote about them.

This is a curious judgment. The standard interpretation of Canada and the Cold War has not been derived solely from the memoirs of the diplomats. As long ago as 1959, when there were few diplomatic recollections available, Robert Spencer wrote a balanced study in the *Canada in World Affairs* series. Later R.D. Cuff and J.L. Granatstein (1978) and James Eayrs (1980) looked into the topic. The conclusions of these writers are not different in essentials from those of the best account available, Escott Reid's *Time of Fear and Hope* (1977).

These earlier works did not see, as Smith does, that British influence, especially coming from Winston Churchill, was decisive in persuading the nervous Mackenzie King to enter into the negotiations for a North Atlantic security treaty in March 1948. They all emphasized the importance of the "crusade" carried on by St. Laurent, Pearson and Reid to sell the Atlantic defence concept, both to Canadians and to Americans. Smith does not see this effort as important. He tends to downplay the Canadian role in arguing and working for NATO, although strong evidence suggests that Canadian politicians and diplomats were among the first to put forward publicly, and the most active in promoting, the idea of a security alliance. Where *Diplomacy of Fear* breaks new ground is in its careful analysis of appreciations of Soviet intentions, made by Canadian and American observers. Six of its seven chapters are devoted to this task; the final chap-


ter contains the author's conclusions, put forward in a rather detached manner.

Were there alternative policies to military ones which Canada might have followed in meeting the Soviet threat to Western interests? Smith does not have much to say on this point. He commends R.A. MacKay and R.M. Macdonnell of the Department of External Affairs for suggesting in 1947 that Canada should undertake air reconnaissance and interception in the Canadian Arctic on her own, thus increasing her influence in Washington. He believes R.A.D. Ford was on the right track when he proposed that Canada give priority to training experts in Russian language, history and politics to develop a home-grown capacity to judge Soviet actions. Denis Smith feels we should have taken the same step to improve our understanding of the United States!

Two comments appear relevant in assessing this study. The first is an observation made by Marcel Cadieux when he attended a Canadian Institute of International Affairs conference in 1948 at which Canada's involvement in the Atlantic security pact was under discussion. A number of the academics present were critical. The discussions, concluded Cadieux, "had been top-heavy with theorists to the exclusion of practical men of affairs" (quoted by James Eayrs in *In Defence of Canada*). Another is the better-known complaint of Charles Ritchie, head of the First Political Division in Ottawa in 1945. "All morning a stream of interesting and informative telegrams and dispatches from missions abroad comes pouring across my desk....I must skim through everything with my mind concentrated on immediate practical implications....Will the Prime Minister sign this?....This is the way policy is made on a hand-to-mouth basis out of an overworked official" (*The Siren Years: A Canadian Diplomat Abroad, 1937-1945*).

Smith's judgments are inclined to be olympian, the conclusions of the scholar in his study, with all the documents from all the interested parties spread out before him. They show little understanding of the problems of the harassed official, dealing not only with the Soviet Union but with the creation of Israel, the re-shaping of the Commonwealth and the foreign exchange crisis with the United States. Whether they add anything to the testimony of the harassed officials is open to doubt.

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To manage or to solve crises?

by Peyton V. Lyon

Conflict Management in the Middle East edited by Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt. Toronto: D.C. Heath and Co., 1987, 323 pages, \$55.95.

The editors, and several of the fifteen contributors, share a "profound conviction" that scholars should "change the emphasis from studying... origins of conflicts... and conflict resolution" to studying "the way conflicts are actually managed." "Many conflicts," they explain, "are here to stay... for a lengthy time."

This plausible contention is of course easy to accept if one is tolerably content with the *status quo*. Most of the contributors to this largely Canadian-Israeli volume appear to be in this category, and a few of them demonstrate that following the prescribed approach can be worthwhile; the most notable example is the brilliant study by Janice Stein of regime creation by Israel and Egypt.

Only one chapter, the one by the Canadian co-editor, suffers from a strong pro-Israel bias. Most of the authors show considerable awareness of the instability in the area, and, had they written some months later, after the outbreak of the teenagers' uprising in the occupied territories, might well have shown less confidence in conflict management and greater