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It is recommended that this oil and the necessary storage be provided during the next eight years at a total cost of approximately £1,000,000, or an annual cost of £125,000.

(b.) *Position of Oil Fuel Reserves.*

Assuming that Bynoe or other Northern Port is decided upon as a fuelling port it is recommended that three-quarters of the Light Cruisers' oil reserve be stored there, and that one-quarter be stored at Southern Ports.

As regards oil for Submarines it is suggested that one-half of the oil reserve for Submarines be located at a suitable port in Australia and the remaining half at Singapore, in order that they may be able, in war, to operate from the latter place as soon as the situation permits.

(c.) *Peace Requirements.*

It is recommended that the allowance of fuel for vessels in commission should be calculated on a similar basis to that adopted in the Royal Navy.

For example, the provision for the China Squadron for 1923-24 is based on 50 days' steaming. To this is added the estimated consumption for the year for auxiliary purposes, and the necessary provision to permit of the authorised trials at special speeds.

(2.) *Armament Supplies.*

The decision to establish a Naval Base at Singapore places Australia in an ideal position to become the source of Armament supplies for the Main Fleet in War.

The manner in which this can be carried out is well expressed in the report laid before the Commonwealth Government by the Admiralty representative (Commander J. G. McHardy, R.N.) who visited Australia for the purpose in 1921.

It is desirable to lay stress on those portions of the report dealing with independent Naval inspection during manufacture, which is regarded as an indispensable condition.

(3.) *Naval and Victualling Stores.*

In view of the great difficulty in arranging supplies from the United Kingdom for a large Fleet operating abroad in time of war, it is strongly recommended that the general lines of development should be such that Australia should ultimately be able, not only to supply the needs of her own forces, but also to assist in meeting those of a large Fleet.

VIII.—*Local Defence.*

The question has arisen whether the Dominions wish the Sub-Committee of the Joint Defence Committee, which is now considering the scales of Defence of British Ports overseas, to examine at the same time the scales of Defence of Dominion Ports.

Scales of Defence, when complete, will include recommendations for Local Naval and Air Defence and for defences on land.

IX.—*Air Co-operation.*

(1.) It is recommended that future Australian Light Cruisers be built to carry one or more amphibians.

(2.) In the meantime, in order to enable the R.A.N. to co-operate in peace time with the Australian Air Force, it is recommended that one existing Light Cruiser be fitted to carry a small seaplane, or alternatively, that the squadron oiler or collier be so fitted.

(3.) It is recommended that plans be prepared with a view to taking up and fitting out a merchant ship as a seaplane carrier in Australia on the outbreak of war.

Admiralty, June 11, 1923.
P.D.01805.

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(Also C.I.D. Paper No. 196-C.)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

IMPERIAL CONFERENCE, 1923.

EMPIRE NAVAL POLICY AND CO-OPERATION.

NEW ZEALAND.

1. *Object.*

TO summarise the naval situation (1923) and to give in outline Admiralty recommendations to New Zealand in pursuance of C.I.D. Paper No. 194-C.

2. *The Naval Situation.*

As a result of the Washington Conference and the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance the strategic situation has changed.

Except for a base in Hawaii, America does not possess and, by the terms of the *Status Quo* Agreement, cannot construct, Naval Bases in the Pacific which would enable the American Fleet to be moved across that ocean.

America is therefore precluded from taking effective action in the Western Pacific.

Consequently the British Empire is left as the sole Power, apart from Japan, capable of operating in these waters. The Four-Power Pact between the United States of America, France, the British Empire and Japan cannot eliminate all possibility of war in that area.

The capital ship superiority of the British over the Japanese Fleet (ratio 5 to 3) is offset to a considerable extent by the great distance at which the Fleet would have to operate from its main bases of supply and repair.

The Main Fleet, therefore, cannot be divided into detachments, but must be ready to move as a whole to any threatened area.

The need for mobility makes it necessary to press on with preparations to enable a rapid concentration of our Main Fleet in the Far East, and the keystone of these preparations is the development of Singapore as a fuelling and repair base.

Even after the completion of the Singapore Fleet base and the intermediate fuelling bases, and assuming the Suez Canal route is available, the Main Fleet will take from one month to six weeks to reach the Far East.

The enemy's obvious and most natural objective during the interval would be Singapore, the seizure of which would deny to our Fleet the control of the Western Pacific and secure the enemy's lines of communication in the direction of Australia and New Zealand.

The main task of the Naval Forces of the Empire in the Western Pacific, operating in the face of superior enemy forces, would consequently be to delay and harass the despatch of an expedition against Singapore, or any operation, such as an attack upon Hong Kong, intended to lead up to such an expedition.

For this purpose two classes of vessel are suitable:—

- (a.) Fast Light Cruisers of great endurance.
- (b.) Large Overseas Submarines.

Light Cruisers are the smallest seagoing ships which can play a part in protecting the ocean trade routes in war, or threatening an enemy's sea communications, and which can provide the necessary sea-going training in peace.

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