

# What's What the World Over

## New Phases of the World's Thinking Recorded in Current Periodicals

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### JAP FIGHTERS' BIBLE

*The Mikado's Sermon to all his Fighting Men, Translated*

THE philosophy of warriors is much the same with any race—except the Germans. The Emperor of Nippon, according to a writer in the Nineteenth Century, sends his men to war with the following splendid admonitions:

First:—Those serving in either branch must consider loyalty their principal duty. Without patriotism they are no better than puppets. However well drilled and systematically organized, troops destitute of loyalty must resemble mere disorderly mobs in the time of active operations. You must remember that the development or decadence of your organization is synonymous with the rise or fall of your country's fortune.

Secondly:—Both land and sea forces must observe the etiquette of discipline. The Commander-in-Chief and the lowest soldier have their functions one towards the other. And all the military relations are not simply those of command on the one hand and obedience on the other; but among men of the same grade there are distinctions of age and youth, long service and new. Recruits should respect the older soldiers, and all inferiors should obey their superiors as they would Ourselves. And this respect should be extended to officers and men of older service, even though belonging to another corps. For their part, superiors should not be haughty and overbearing.

Thirdly:—Military men should hold valour in the highest esteem. From remote ages heroism has been adored in Our domains; and, therefore, every subject in Our nation should be staunch. Still more should those whose duty it is to be always ready for battle, constantly remember that they should be valiant. But of valour there are two degrees. Aggressive and boisterous behaviour is not courage. Hence those who serve should keep guard over their temper, and always act with due reflection. They should invariably do their duty with precision, neither despising a weak nor dreading a mighty foe. This is to be really intrepid. Hence those who have gallantry in true reverence will cultivate suavity in their intercourse with others, and endeavour to secure for themselves affection and respect. Should they be rough and violent on trifling provocation, people will come to dislike them and regard them as wolves.

Fourthly:—Military men should be inspired by mutual integrity and fidelity. This principle is applicable to the whole community, but more stringently to soldiers, who are impotent among their fellows without it. We may explain "integrity" as the performance of one's word, and "fidelity" as assiduity in the discharge of one's duty. To be thus just and faithful one must consider, from the very commencement, all one's actions and one's ability to do what one has promised. If one thoughtlessly pledges his word to anything which he is not certain he can perform with integrity and fidelity, he is liable to expose himself to great trouble. Subsequent repentance will be of no avail. Therefore it is well to deliberate beforehand; and, if one finds success unattainable, to relinquish the project soon.

Fifthly:—Soldiers should be frugal. Otherwise they are liable to become effeminate, selfish, luxurious, and lastly greedy and mean-minded. Virtue and valour must then fade, and come to be despised, which would be a great calamity. Should such an abuse once obtain, it will spread like a canker, and corrupt even the chivalrous. Dreading such a result, We, some time ago, framed the "Regulations for dismissal"; and being still anxious We address you a caution which We warn you not heedlessly to disregard.

### WHO IS OUR ENEMY?

*The noted Belgian, Charles Sarolea, says it is Austria!*

CHARLES SAROLEA, the well-known Belgian intellectual now in England, declares, in Everyman, that we make a mistake in believing Prussia is our principal enemy. He names, instead, Austria. There is, he writes, one very plain and obvious proof that we are not fighting only Prussian Militarism, namely this—that Prussia has long since ceased to exist, and has long since expanded into something very different from the military State created by Frederick the Great. Prussia has long ago been merged into Germany, and Germany has long ago been merged into Pan-Germany. There can be no greater historical error than the assumption that the achievement of Bismarck is only the continuation and completion of the achievement of Frederick the Great. It would be much more accurate to say that Bismarck has destroyed the work of Frederick the Great. The achievement of Frederick was the constitution of a National State. The life work of Frederick the Great was the triumphant struggle of Prussia against Austria and the destruction of the Holy Roman Empire. On the contrary, the achievement of Bismarck was, first, the union and fusion of Prussia with Germany, and ultimately the union and fusion of Germany with Austria. Frederick was the builder of a National State. Bismarck was the builder of an Empire. After Sadowa short-sighted Prussian courtiers and politicians advocated the annexation of Austrian territories as the spoils of victory. Bismarck opposed such annexation, and was in turn attacked and lauded for his moderation. We understand to-day the meaning of this strange moderation. We realize that he only refused to annex a few isolated fragments of the Austrian dominions because he hoped ultimately to incorporate the whole of the Austrian Empire. He had a prophetic vision of the part which Austria would have to play in the Pan-Germanic Empire of the future. He paved the way for the reconstruction of the Holy Roman Empire on a wider, and stronger, basis.

But even the most far-seeing statesmen do not always foresee the full consequences of their policy. Bismarck believed that it was Prussia which was annexing both Germany and Austria. He did not foresee that it was Austria which would eventually annex Germany. Bismarck believed that he had constituted a Protestant and National Empire. He did not foresee that by welding together Prussia, Southern Germany and Austria he was reconstructing the Holy Roman Empire. Bismarck proclaimed

that Prussian interests in the Balkans were not worth the bones of one Pomeranian Grenadier. He did not foresee that by endorsing the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and by initiating the Oriental policy of Austria he was deflecting the whole course of Prussian and German history. He did not realize that from the moment he diverted Austrian ambitions in an Eastern and Southern direction, the aims of Prussia and Germany would have to be fatally subordinated to the aims of Austria.

Arising out of the first misconception as to the significance of the Bismarckian Empire there is a second error, no less fatal, namely, that Austria is only a secondary factor in German policy, a passive



Emperor William—"I know that's Francis Joseph. I recognize the boots."

—Shields, Toronto Telegram.

Ally, a "loyal secundant." The error has been sedulously encouraged by the Germans themselves, to mislead European opinion, to make Europe under-rate the Austrian peril. In the alliance between Austria and Germany it is no doubt true that in a sense Germany is the stronger partner, but it is equally true that the stronger partner is driven on by the weaker partner. Since the Congress of Berlin it is Austria and not Germany which has determined the foreign policy of the Dual Alliance. It is Austrian interests which have controlled Prussian interests, and not Prussian interests which have controlled Austrian interests. It was the obvious interest of Prussia, as Bismarck clearly saw, to remain on good terms with Russia. It was the Austrian interest to break with Russia and to impose Austrian and Hungarian ascendancy in Eastern and Southern Europe. And, therefore, it is entirely to misread the meaning of this War to call it a Prussian or even a German War. It is primarily an Austrian and a Magyar War. Prussia has ever been hostile to Pan-Germanic dreams. Austria has ever been a Pan-Germanic Power. It is Vienna which has dragged Berlin into this catastrophe. At the beginning of the War the German statesmen proclaimed that they knew nothing of the Austrian ultimatum. These protests were obviously a lie, but the lie contained an essential truth. The Serbian quarrel was mainly an Austrian quarrel, and but for this quarrel, but for the Oriental ambitions of Austria, this War could never have taken place.

What has prevented European statesmen from realizing this vital fact is not merely their misconception of Austrian policy, but their ignorance of the solid foundations of Austrian power. They have



Then and Now—German Self-deception!

—Tribune, New York.