



with the law, the nature of evidence, the relevance of testimony to the main issues; he is only incidentally a historian. What would often be of primary interest to the historian was rejected as evidence by the court. Opinions of experts and affidavits of diplomatists with special knowledge of Japan were not accepted by the court. For obvious political reasons, it was impossible to examine and analyze internal developments in such countries for example as China or the U.S.S.R. in the years in which Japan was directing various forms of aggression or intrigue against them. It is, for instance, highly pertinent to the historian to know whether there was any significant pro-Japanese faction among Chinese leaders, and what relations such a faction might have had either with Japanese authorities or with groups in Japan which were not committed to all-out aggression. To put it another way, Japan was not only *acting* upon others but in some fashion was *being acted upon* and this highly complex inter-relationship could not adequately be explored. Thus perhaps the least satisfactory aspect of the judgment for the historian's purpose is the section which deals with Sino-Japanese relations. There were also certain witnesses held by Soviet authorities whose appearance in the court might have added to our knowledge of pre-war relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. Despite these limitations, the record contributes materially to a fresh understanding of both Japanese foreign and internal policies from 1928 to 1945.

Japanese aggression was incubated, if not hatched, even earlier than marked out by the indictment. Okawa Shumei, one of the defendants, in the early