For if it be established that the Dominion Parliament can create such companies, then it becomes a question of general interest throughout the Dominion in what fashion they should be permitted to trade. . . . They do not desire to be understood as suggesting, that because the status of the Dominion Company enables it to trade in a province and thereby confers on it civil rights to some extent, the power to regulate trade and commerce can be exercised in such a way as to trench, in the case of such companies, on the exclusive jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures over civil rights in general. No doubt this jurisdiction would conflict with that of the province if civil rights were to be read as an expression of unlimited scope. But, as has already been pointed out, the expression must be construed consistently with various powers conferred by secs. 91 and 92, which restrict its literal scope. It is enough for present purposes to say that the province cannot legislate so as to deprive a Dominion company of its status and powers. This does not mean that the powers can be exercised in contravention of the laws of the province restricting the rights of the public in the province generally. What it does mean is that the status and powers of a Dominion company *as such* cannot be destroyed by provincial legislation. This conclusion appears to their lordships to be in full harmony with what was laid down by the Board in *Citizens Insurance Company* v. *Parsons* (*supra* p. 53); *Colonial Building Association* v. *The Attorney-General for Quebec* (*supra* p. 56), and *Bank of Toronto* v. *Lambe* (*supra* p. 32.)

" It follows from these premises that these provisions of the Companies Act of British Columbia which are relied on in the present case as compelling the appellant company to obtain a provincial license of the kind about which the controversy has arisen, or