

Point of Order

Mr. Speaker, I would also refer you to the so-called Gladstone amendment of 1866, to the Standing Order of the British House of Commons and to the ninth report of the Senate Standing Committee on National Finance tabled in the Senate on February 13, 1990 concerning the Senate's traditional treatment of legislation with royal recommendations.

Beauchesne's goes on to state in Citation 974:

The Minister of Finance presents the House of Commons with a budget statement by moving a motion "That this House approves in general the budgetary policy of the government—"

This House divided positively on this motion in 1989 thus approving the financial provisions set out in that budget to fix UI premium rates for three years and to modify the financial provisions of the act.

Attempts to modify these provisions as amendments 7 and 9 do are a clear attempt by the other place to change budgetary policy. As we know, budgetary policy is the sole prerogative of the Crown and the House of Commons. To allow the other place to dictate this policy through amendments 7 and 9 would be a clear breach of our responsibilities as elected members of Parliament. The additional costs to the Consolidated Revenue Fund resulting in a change in the 1989 budget as proposed by the other place would exceed \$1.75 billion annually.

Amendments 5(a) and (b) are contrary to the royal recommendation because they propose to substitute an alternate scheme to that proposed with the royal recommendation.

Clause 22 of Bill C-21 designs a penalty system for people who quit their jobs without just cause by imposing a penalty of seven to twelve weeks.

Amendments 5(a) and (b) propose a different and more expensive—over \$350 million—scheme than that provided for in the royal recommendation. For this reason 5(a) and (b) should be ruled out of order.

Amendment 7 attempts to design Consolidated Revenue Fund participation for a new version of regionally extended benefits which would exceed \$1.5 billion annually. This amount is out of order for two reasons. First, it provides for an alternate scheme to that proposed with the royal recommendation. Second, it infringes on the financial initiative of the Crown by establishing payment

from the CRF which was explicitly withdrawn in the 1989 budget approved by this House.

Amendment 9 also attempts to design Consolidated Revenue Fund participation for the payment of fishing benefits which exceed \$250 million annually. This amendment is out of order for two reasons. First, it provides for an alternate scheme to that proposed with the royal recommendation. Second, it infringes on the financial initiative of the Crown by establishing payments with the CRF which were withdrawn from the 1989 budget approved by the House.

It is the duty of members to protect the rights and responsibilities accorded to this House, not only by the Constitution Act and our Standing Orders, but by centuries of parliamentary procedure and rulings which have given financial responsibility to the House of Commons.

It is incumbent upon us, the elected representatives of the people, to ensure that the nation's finances are guarded by the people's representatives, by members of Parliament who must seek again the support of an elected body, not by appointed people.

I have listed some of the parliamentary rulings. I would urge all members to abide by their responsibilities and recognize that what is being asked of us is trampling on the traditions and responsibilities of this House.

I would like to refer the House to citation 620 of Beauchesne's sixth edition which talks about amendments to a tax act. In fact, what we are talking about here, taxes applied to employees and employers for the purposes of funding UI, are taxes in a real sense which represents billions of dollars to those paying their tax.

I quote citation 620(2):

(2) This method involves more than just a question of agreement. It involves a question of the privileges of the House which have been enshrined in Standing Order 80. But if the House, in its wisdom, feels that the circumstances are such that it should waive its asserted privileges it does so, in effect, by suspending Standing order 80. Therefore, unless a motion proposes to suspend Standing Order 80, it would require the unanimous consent of the House to pass the amendments which are proposed.

• (1520)

With that citation we are in a situation that, in fact, were we to want to accept the amendments of the Senate, they would have to be preceded by a motion to