

*External Affairs*

Peking and Moscow. I should like the house to remember that even although that agreement exists China is not necessarily lost. If Moscow is going to behave towards China as it has behaved towards other countries which communist parties have taken over; in other words, if Moscow is going to try to make China another satellite nation, then I am certain that the Russian policy is doomed to failure.

On the other hand, I am equally certain that we cannot make an ally of China. Therefore our policy should be designed to try to ensure its neutrality, and anything which looks like hostility towards that country will have the effect merely of pushing it further into the arms of the Russians. Today in Asia communism is not the strongest force. Nationalism is the strongest, and after nationalism the desire for economic progress. We have to realize these things, and if we do then I think the west is capable of giving the lead which is so essential.

There was another part of the argument of the leader of the opposition which rather intrigued me. In part he objected to the recognition of China on legalistic grounds, but at the same time and in the same speech he welcomed the recognition which had been accorded Viet Nam. I do not know on what grounds he did so because there is infinitely less reason in law for recognizing Viet Nam than there is for recognizing China. On the other hand, it may be that his argument is the moral one that we detest and despise communism and therefore we should not give the accolade of recognition to any such regime. If we are going to argue on a moral basis then we must be consistent, and we must be prepared to withdraw recognition from those communist-dominated nations to whom we have already accorded it. I will go much further than that and say that communist-dominated nations are not the only ones whose customs I dislike intensely. I would think if we are going to be thoroughly logical in our moral condemnation we have to go the whole way, and if we do that we will have to cut down our diplomatic staff until it is perhaps the size of a corporal's guard.

I said that Viet Nam does not satisfy the legal conditions necessary for recognition. Again that is not a matter which worries me unduly because recognition of Viet Nam is not a legal matter. It is a diplomatic manoeuvre and another step in the cold war. I think we ought to give some consideration to what is happening in that country because of the consequences of the actions of the western powers and of Russia. There are two factions in Viet Nam. The first is headed

[Mr. Stewart (Winnipeg North).]

by Bao Dai. He is a French puppet who was educated in Europe. I am informed he is a bit of a playboy, but then he is youthful. He abdicated in 1946 and afterwards served under Ho. On the other hand there is Ho Chi Minh, his great rival. He is a communist agent, one who worked with Borodin in China, one who is playing a very skilful and cagey game today. He is the one of course who is recognized by Russia, and that is important because I do not think Russia would have recognized Ho unless the Kremlin had been reasonably certain that he was going to be successful in his struggle. The house will remember that Russia did not recognize the insurgents in Greece, but they have given recognition to Ho who may of course have received the kiss of death recently when he found that Tito had also accorded him diplomatic recognition.

There are certain arguments in favour of the recognition of Bao Dai. The first is that recognition by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as one would expect, has raised his prestige amongst the native population, an argument which is probably quite valid. Another is that he controls the large centres of population in Viet Nam. Nevertheless over the whole picture I doubt very much whether he controls the loyalty of 25 per cent of the people of that country, and certainly he does not control the majority of the land mass. It has been argued that he is the only alternative to Ho and that we could do nothing else. It is perhaps also true that we are endeavouring to support France, that the French wished to recognize Bao Dai to preserve to some extent the stability of the French government on this matter, and it was essential to go along with their desires. Perhaps the best argument of all is that the reality of the cold war demanded that recognition.

On the other hand—and I am presenting these alternatives to the house—there are arguments against it. In the first place Bao Dai is obviously a French puppet. He does not control the foreign affairs of his country and he does not control the armies of his country.

He does not control the finances of his country, nor does he control the judiciary. All these come under the control of France; and until the people of Viet Nam have more control and more to say in their own country I doubt very much whether it will be possible to persuade the nationalists to swing in behind Bao. What we in the western world seem to have done is try to bolster a colonial regime. We are faced with the fact that the Russians have recognized Ho; and having recognized him, they may feel it right and proper to support him. The western world has recognized