

identification with their ethnic group, the arithmetic in each country (14% Tutsi, 85 % Hutu) means that the ground for compromise and confidence-building between the two groups is extremely limited.

### *Bad Politics*

This problem is worsened by the weakness of civic culture, government institutions and rule of law in both countries: given the history of coups, military and extra-military violence and failed democratic attempts, enshrining any number of guarantees in constitutional or other legal instruments may be necessary but hardly sufficient to restore peace. The massacres in each country since last year have, moreover, made reconciliation that much harder to achieve as the worst fears of each side about the other have been realized.

### *International frustration and exhaustion*

The international community is already reluctant to become too deeply involved, particularly in restoring security and in aiding the Rwandan government. Rwandan relief efforts will surely exceed \$1 billion and, with an eye on what has occurred in Somalia, donors will be very cautious to commit significant new sums to peacekeeping or reconstruction in either Rwanda or Burundi if there are no durable solutions in place. Other commitments, such as Angola, loom and will compete with central African needs.

## **4. NEW APPROACHES**

In view of these factors, new approaches are needed which combine short, medium and long-term measures.

### **I. An overarching necessity: Explicit conditionality**

Any considerations of durable solutions must accept two premises:

- international involvement is essential;
- fundamental changes must be engineered.

The two condition each other, and the international community must not be shy about making the linkages explicit. At each stage towards reconstruction and reconciliation, international conditions will have to be set -- and be met -- before we embark on the next stage. As Somalia has shown, it is important to send clear