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So far, the global political changes underway do not appear to have reached the point of materially altering military planners' calculations of capabilities and potential threats. However, with the Conventional Forces negotiations proceeding rapidly in Vienna, with substantial reductions in tanks and other equipment expected to be agreed by summer 1990, it would be totally unrealistic for any government in the position of Canada's, to proceed with a major acquisition such as the promised new battle tanks for the Canadian Forces in Germany. Canadian participation, through our NATO contingent, has taken on heightened political importance by helping buffer European-US relations during the all-important process of East-West negotiations and the reductions that will follow. However, the outcome of those negotiations will soon have a major impact on the overall importance of a Canadian contingent. Either way, Canadian foreign and military policy must explore a range of highly unpredictable future options, in a field where decisions have long lead-times and very high price tags.

The challenge now, is to arrive at decisions that will provide Canada's defence planners, and Armed Forces personnel, with clear directions and credible assurance that they will be equipped to carry out the tasks assigned to them. For this challenge to be met, there is no alternative to an in-depth public debate of policy options.

#### **Issues for Informed Debate**

■ As the Defence White Paper acknowledged, the country's security comprises three inter-related components: defence policy and programmes; arms control and disarmament possibilities; and conflict resolution activities

territory imposes additional costs, there is a clear need to examine how Canada's defence capability can achieve the highest cost-effectiveness. Should Canada try to maintain a fully balanced (and full-time professional) force capability, and a full-fledged national military infrastructure? Is it possible for a middle power to seek specialized "niches" of excellence in defence as we must in other areas?

■ For most potential strategic military threats Canadian territory and airspace are inseparably linked with those of the United States. This fact dictates the Canadian need to influence US policies where vital Canadian interests are different. Conversely, US vital interests will also need to be taken into account in Canadian policies – implying the continuing search for compromise in this distinctly asymmetrical relationship.

■ The North Atlantic Alliance is likely to remain an important umbrella framework for Western European-North American political, security and defence cooperation. While this cooperation has mainly taken the form of North American contingents and reinforcement capabilities for Europe, as well as joint naval operations, it is possible that the Western Europeans will take greater share of a reduced overall burden of European defence in future. This raises the possibility of a smaller direct North American contribution in Europe, and conceivably a strengthened European naval and air participation in NATO's North American area.

■ The Arctic represents a major frontier region in East-West relations, with Canada and the Soviet Union having the largest territorial stake. The possibilities for constructive coop-

and the reduction of security threats be distinctive Canadian priorities for and circumpolar action. have been drawn into a number of ing and expensive new tasks by the on of competing military technologies East and West. The North Warning the emphasis on Forward Operating ns, Forward Dispersal Bases, low-level exercises, and aerospace and submarine ance requirements are all developments or implications for Canadian defence basic Canadian interests in our rela- th the US. Wherever possible, Canada seek the reductions of technological ments which could increase these s.

■ For certain kinds of traditional and new international challenges to Canadian security, the appropriate response may not lie either in military defence capability or in cooperation with the US. These challenges include: the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty; enforcement of Canadian fisheries zones and regulations; environmental protection; coastal surveillance and enforcement capability against drug trafficking or illegal entry; services such as ice-breaking, and search and rescue operations. These "security" services may or may not prove possible to handle in tandem, or "multi-tasked," with more traditionally-defined naval and air operations. What is certain is that all of these requirements are intensifying while the available resources are not expanding. The public (as various opinion surveys attest) is primarily concerned with seeing these needs met.

■ Peacekeeping has been a substantial part of Canadian defence activity for decades and an unparalleled Canadian contribution to international security through the UN system. UN peacekeeping has suddenly undergone a huge expansion to respond to the new willingness of the major powers to see conflicts resolved under international supervision. No country's armed forces have a higher level of experience, capability and acceptability for these tasks than do Canada's. And Canada has been involved in all of these operations, to the point where it has become difficult to consider peacekeeping as a mere "auxiliary" role for our Armed Forces. How we will now rank these peacekeeping tasks among our security policy priorities will be a key question for the allocation of our defence resources. □

— BERNARD WOOD