

support it. It notes with regret and concern the failure of Israel to comply with the terms of the earlier resolutions adopted by the Assembly on this subject, and it requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to secure the complete withdrawal of Israel forces and to report within five days on the matter to the General Assembly. The words of the draft resolution are quite clear in this regard.

Our delegation shares the regret expressed by other Members of the Assembly that a situation has arisen in which compliance with the earlier resolutions on withdrawal has not yet been completed. But we would also regret and be concerned about a withdrawal merely to the old state of affairs. And we recall at this time that the earlier resolutions, in accordance with the terms of which Israel forces are to withdraw, dealt with matters other than territorial withdrawal, but matters which are related to this essential step. Therefore, I hope that the Secretary-General, in his efforts—which we support—to bring about compliance regarding withdrawal will in the further report which he is to make to us give consideration to ways and means of securing and stabilizing through United Nations action the situation after withdrawal has taken place and pending that political settlement which alone can establish real and lasting peace and security in the area.

Surely there must be no return, if we can avoid it, to the conditions which helped to provoke the initial military action. That has been the position of my delegation from the very beginning of the Assembly's consideration of this grave question. Speaking as the representative of Canada, in my first intervention in our discussion of this subject on the night of 1-2 November, I said:

The armed forces of Israel and of Egypt are to... return to the Armistice lines, where presumably... they will once again face each other in fear and hatred. What then... six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? Are we to return merely to the *status quo ante*? Such a return would not be to a position of security... but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion... (A/PV. 562, page 131)

That remains our feeling on this matter, and that feeling has been reflected in statements made and in resolutions on this subject which the Assembly has already passed and which we have supported. Therefore, it seems to me that it is an essential part of our work not only to bring about a military withdrawal but also to do what we can to avoid the restoration of a situation of disturbance, unrest and incidents which might require the United Nations to intervene all over again in the future in order to stop new fighting.

The Secretary-General's report recognizes this danger. It refers to the resolution (997ES-I) of 2 November which states the obligations of the parties to withdraw, but which requires them also "to desist from raids across the armistice lines" and "to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements". The report refers also to the resolution (999 ES-I) of 4 November, which goes beyond mere withdrawal. And, furthermore, as the Secretary-General states in his report, certain of those related aspects of withdrawal will assume added importance once a military withdrawal is effected. But even now, I suggest, we cannot ignore these related aspects in dealing with the question. Therefore, in asking the Secretary-General to report back to us it is my hope that he will report on these other matters, with suggestions to the Assembly on what can and should be done.

The Secretary-General has already indicated, in paragraph 11 of his report, that study might be given, for instance, to "the question of the extent to which the (United Nations Emergency) Force might assume responsibilities so far carried by the Truce Supervision Organization". That Truce Supervision Organization certainly has not itself, in our view, the power or authority effectively to interpose itself between the forces of the two conflicting parties. The United Nations Emergency Force, however, would now be effective for this purpose, and, following closely Israeli forces, could be deployed in the area of the demarcation line from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Aqaba, where it could function in order to prevent incidents, to keep the peace and to make secure the cessation of hostilities which has already been brought about by the United Nations. And in so doing it would facilitate the compliance of the parties concerned with other relevant United Nations recommendations which have been or which may be passed.