

not counterbalanced by any benefit which can accrue to His Majesty's service from putting Cumberland Fort in a state of defence.

Cumberland Basin, at the head of which Cumberland Fort is situated, is dry, or nearly so, at low water. The tide at Cumberland Basin rises 45 feet upon usual occasions, and 60 feet at Spring tides. Cumberland Basin is not, therefore, likely to be selected as a place of debarkation.

It appears to us, that an enemy would never attempt to make any attack upon Nova Scotia by the head of the Bay of Fundy, without being previously master, if not of the whole of the province of New Brunswick, at least of St. John's. If in uncontrolled possession of the Bay of Fundy, and at liberty to choose his points of debarkation, with a view to a serious invasion of Nova Scotia; surely he would select the Gut of Annapolis, or the inlets of the Bay of Minas, which would, either of them, carry his armaments a considerable way into the province, and much nearer the main object, (Halifax,) than landing at the remote basin of Cumberland, supposing in other respects even it was equally convenient. It appears, therefore, that if the armament against Nova Scotia was to be conveyed by water, Cumberland Fort could afford no protection. But the enemy may propose to advance by land, and to march round the head of the Bay of Fundy, which operation is practicable. Such an enterprise bespeaks a very superior force on the part of the enemy. Cumberland Fort, which guards no pass, and which could easily be turned and avoided, would, in such a case, of course be blockaded and passed. An invasion of the nature we have supposed, we respectfully submit to your Grace, could not be made with such rapidity, (having New Brunswick previously to take possession of,) but that there would be sufficient time to assemble the militia and disposable force of Nova Scotia, and to occupy the passes in the hills over which the road from Cumberland Fort towards Halifax is conducted. These hills, called the Cumberland Hills, offer every facility for defence. An enemy would not be able to force them, and is more likely to attempt to turn them by the inlet of the Bay of Minas, which has its head near Truro. This renders the occupation of Windsor, and the maintaining there a defensible post with a depôt of arms and ammunition for the militia, as we have already had the honour to submit to your Grace, of the more consequence. As a central situation, upon very strong ground, and at the head of that branch of the Bay of Minas nearest to Halifax, we attach considerable importance to Windsor. Upon the principle your Grace has laid down in our instructions for the Niagara frontier, and which we have endeavoured to apply on every other line of defence where it could be acted upon, we think your Grace will be of opinion, that next to the defence of Halifax, the possession of Windsor is of the greatest importance for the preservation of Nova Scotia. Cumberland Fort, we submit with deference to your Grace, may with propriety be abandoned.

We have added in our Appendix (letter A) to the state of fortifications, a return of the provincial batteries of Nova Scotia. These works are kept up by the province, and manned by the militia, for the defence of the different bays and harbours.

49. In a printed abstract of a report of a Committee of both Houses of the Provincial Legislature of Nova Scotia, presented to the Governor in 1819 (which we accidentally met with), we read a recommendation of a communication to be opened with Canada by means of a military road, to commence at that point where the road from Halifax to the head of the Peticodiac turns towards Frederickton, to proceed by the heads of the Nashwark, the Miramichi and the Ristigouchi Rivers, until it should meet the road on the right bank of the St. Lawrence opposite the Isle of Bie. This road (it is stated in the report alluded to) would open a fine country for settlement, and connect Halifax and Frederickton with Quebec; would avoid all interruptions by water; and being so distant from the frontier on the St. John's, would give support to that line, in case of war, without danger of interception from the enemy.

We were struck with the apparent good sense of these remarks, and had already made some inquiries as to the actual state of the country through which it was proposed to conduct this road, and committed some memorandums upon the subject to writing, when, upon Lieutenant-General Sir James Kempt's arrival at Halifax, we found that he had, during his absence in England, had the honour of conversing with your Grace upon this proposed communication; that