

substantial. The maintenance of law and order, for instance, should enable the Congolese government to operate initially, and gradually to establish itself. The alternatives in this field are far from obvious or likely to be satisfactory to all concerned including African states. Furthermore, the basic framework provided by the UN should enable the Congolese government, with the help of other African governments if so desired, to develop machinery of its own to enforce such policies as it may determine later on to be in the national interest.

7. In short, it seems to us that the African states might be encouraged to consider whether there can be an acceptable alternative to UN operations, and whether the Congolese government and friendly neighbouring states will not, as a result of such operations (even if they involve limitations), be given the necessary basic and expanding freedom of action which they require to work out the African solutions which they may desire.

8. In the circumstances would it not be in the interests of all concerned and, in particular, of the African states, to accept the temporary and rather modest limitations inherent in UN operations. It occurs to us that if properly handed, such limitations, from the African point of view, e.g. the presence of non African units in the UN forces, may even have advantages in setting the stage for cooperation between African states and those of other continents. The same considerations apply with greater force in relation to the broad programme of technical and other assistance which is now being worked out. In fact, through the UN, outside assistance even for African solutions is likely to be available sooner and to be more substantial than would otherwise be the case.

9. While we would not wish to suggest directly in Accra that moderation should be recommended to Lumumba, we wonder whether you think that it would be useful for our High Commissioner there to raise the above problems in the form of questions, and to suggest that in terms of African aspirations, patience and moderation in dealing with the UN may yet provide the best, if not the only, solution.

[N.A.] ROBERTSON

23.

DEA/6386-C-40

Note pour le premier ministre

Memorandum for Prime Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], August 22, 1960

CONGO: SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT CANADIAN CONTINGENT

On August 6 the Soviet representative left a memorandum with the Secretary-General objecting to the inclusion of Canadian troops in the United Nations Force in the Congo.¹² Mr. Green dealt with a question on this subject in the House on August 8 (a copy of his remarks is attached).†

The United Nations Secretariat, in dealing with the Soviet complaint, maintained that the inclusion of Canadians in the Force was based on their technical competence and linguistic qualifications. The Secretary-General saw no inconsistency in the fact that Canada was a member of NATO.

¹² Voir Nations Unies, *Documents officiels du Conseil de sécurité, quinzième année, Supplément de juillet, août et septembre 1960*, document S/4418.

See United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960*, document S/4418.