

offshore islands<sup>3</sup> and Mideast.<sup>4</sup> The Canadian Government felt, however, that it had a vital interest in maintenance of peace and therefore in preventing these local issues from degenerating into a global conflict. On the other hand in a global conflict there could be no doubt Canada would have to stand by USA. In view of blank cheques apparently issued by USA to certain leaders in Mideast and Far East the question very much in Canadian minds was how many more such blank cheques had been issued. Mr. Negrao de Lima replied that he shared minister's concern and apprehensions. Brazil's position (is?) fairly similar to that of Canada in that, if Brazil was not committed by Rio Treaty<sup>5</sup> to join USA in any issue arising out of American security zone, this restriction became academic in the event of a global war.

(c) *Operation Pan America.*

Mr. Negrao de Lima then claimed that perhaps never before had Brazil been so clearly identified with Western camp as had been indicated by launching this year of Operation Pan America.<sup>6</sup> This initiative stemmed from a deep concern that the West's passive policies were making it possible for the USSR to achieve progress all around the world and were losing the initiative in the Cold War. However, the pattern of the Cold War had changed from a military to an economic and technological nature, and it was to cope with this new challenge that President Kubitschek had launched operation Pan America. Negrao de Lima asked if Mr. Smith would care to comment.

Mr. Smith explained that on that date beginning with President Kubitschek's letter to President Eisenhower last May,<sup>7</sup> he had been struck by this most distinctive and most promising approach to the problems of the American hemisphere. Using UN Secretary General's plan of open economic development of Mideast as background, the Minister commented that he could not but think that it was up to each area to make first effort at settling its regional economic problems. This was only sound decision stopping Soviet economic penetration. The Minister added that, since he was among friends, he had no qualms about discussing frankly questions of how Canada could fit in operation Pan America. He really did not know answer to question thus raised but he would like to draw attention to Canada's relatively small population and to her relatively high per capita contributions to international organizations. He also drew attention to Canada's extremely heavy commitments to North American defence where figures were astronomical and where government, as in the case of CF-105,<sup>8</sup> was faced with crucial and perplexing priority problems. Having said that, Minister could still state that he acclaimed operation Pan America even if he did not at this point know where Canada could fit in picture. The Minister invited Brazilians to look at Canada's commitments as a whole but suggested that whatever Canada did in any other area was of help to Latin America and vice versa, since we were "in same boat."

<sup>3</sup> Voir chapitre III, 2<sup>e</sup> partie.

See Chapter III, Part 2.

<sup>4</sup> Voir chapitre II, 5<sup>e</sup> partie.

See Chapter II, Part 5.

<sup>5</sup> Voir le document 17, note 42./See Document 17, note 42.

<sup>6</sup> En mai 1958, le président brésilien Juscelino Kubitschek a proposé l'Opération « Pan America » pour renforcer les liens politiques entre les républiques d'Amérique et pour accorder une plus grande attention au problème de sous-développement de l'Amérique latine.

In May 1958, Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek proposed Operation Pan America to strengthen political ties among the American republics and to devote greater attention to the problem of underdevelopment in Latin America.

<sup>7</sup> Voir/See United States, Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 992, June 30, 1958, pp. 1091,

<sup>8</sup> Voir le chapitre premier, 4<sup>e</sup> partie, section A./See Chapter I, Part 4, Section A.