

months ago. This is a dereliction of duty and responsibility that I, for one, find very hard to swallow. With all its fine talk and public posturing the Canadian government continued with its assistance for almost a full decade after it knew for sure what India was doing. This government is as responsible for India being a nuclear weapons state today as the Indian government itself.

And what of today, Mr. Chairman? We still talk bravely about the non-proliferation of nuclear arms, but we still assist others and we plan to assist even more nations in the future by the same antiquated and ineffective means. The other day the minister talked about bilateral agreements. We had a bilateral agreement for inspection with India. I want the minister to tell us about Canadian inspection of India's power plant and India's nuclear research reactor. When did those inspections take place? It was the responsibility of Canada, not of the agency, not of the UN, not of any other international force but of Canada to inspect the nuclear power plant in India and to inspect the nuclear research reactor in India. Who did the inspection? When did they inspect? What did they inspect? What were their terms of reference? What did they do when they found that plutonium was disappearing into a research plant for obviously explosive purposes? I hope the minister is going to give us a full accounting tonight of what I hope I am incorrectly calling "ten years of Canadian failure".

The minister talked of international inspection the other day. We supposedly have international inspection now with other Canadian reactors in other places. Outside Karachi in Pakistan I along with some other members of the House, saw a CANDU reactor. I talked to Canadian and to Pakistani engineers and, on the promise not to divulge names, they told me—and I suspect they told other members—that right now international inspection is a joke among them. There is no meaningful international inspection. This is not ten years ago; this is now, one year after India exploded its bomb using Canadian technology.

If the minister is going to rely on stricter international inspection I hope that tonight he—or perhaps the Prime Minister who is talking to the Nuclear Association tonight—will detail exactly what changes are being made on the ground, and in regard to inspection of personnel, their standards, their powers, their terms of reference and most of all, what the remedy or corrective measures will be for infractions of the rules. Is this academic? Is this hypothetical? I do not think so.

Pakistan has already said—and quite frankly, why not in the face of Canada continually ignoring her problem with India—that she, too, will now be forced to acquire a nuclear capability equal to that of India. And Pakistan's only present source of plutonium is a Canadian nuclear reactor!

Some of the changes in policies which I hope the minister will announce tonight were outlined by my leader in the debate this afternoon. It is no good for Canada to try to lock the barn door after it has been blown off its hinges. It was an empty gesture last year for Canada to cut off further nuclear co-operation with India. In the face of private and public warnings we are justified in asking the minister why it was not done ten years ago and not after an explosion has taken place.

Business of Supply

Why have inspection methods and remedies for infractions of rules which have not been changed before now? If they are being changed now, what are the changes? Finally what does the minister have to report to the House on the persistent and consistent rumours that the capability of producing nuclear explosions is spreading in the Far East—to India, Pakistan, Taiwan and South Korea, for instance? What about the rumour that India has traded or sold Canadian know-how to one of the Arab states?

It does not take much imagination to conjure up visions of what might happen in the present Israeli-Arab conflict if either side gained an advantage due to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. If that happens, through the Canada-India route that is rumoured, then this government is going to have a great deal more to account for to future generations.

These are matters that I hope the minister will explain tonight, Mr. Chairman. This country, and I suggest to you the whole world, Mr. Chairman, deserve some answers.

Mr. MacEachen: Mr. Chairman, a number of questions have been asked and a number of very important statements made in debate this afternoon and evening. I certainly welcome the comments of hon. members who have participated in debate and, in particular, those who have focused attention upon the question of non-proliferation and Canada's policies and efforts in that direction.

I must say that I welcomed the subject matter of some of the comments if not the substance of them, on a number of items. The hon. member who just took his seat raised the question of our relations with India in the field of nuclear energy. Since becoming Secretary of State for External Affairs, I have been waiting to hear comments on that important incident and development, an incident important in the nuclear field and important in our bilateral relations with India. It may not be profitable to cover all the past history of the matter, but I understand that in the days before any international inspection was properly established it was understood, certainly by Canada, that India would use nuclear materials solely for peaceful purposes. Canada restated that understanding over the years and it was restated in the correspondence to which my hon. friend referred a moment or so ago.

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It was not understood—indeed, we do not accept today—that there could be a nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes. We have taken that position as a country all through the years and we restated that position at the recent conference to do with the non-proliferation treaty review. Indeed, we do not think that the technology or environmental safeguards have been developed which would provide for a peaceful nuclear explosion. So, it may be that the Indian explosion was a breach of good faith, went against the understanding we had developed in good faith. Of course, the Indians will claim vigorously that they acted within the parameters of their understanding.

At the last General Assembly I had a detailed discussion in this point with the Indian foreign minister. But, an explosion took place. It shocked our consciences in Canada, particularly as it had been made possible by a research reactor of the early days with material which had