

affect our cherished status. This reason may have been valid 25 years ago. Its unreality now is shown by the fact that the new African Commonwealth nations were the initiators of the Secretariat idea and that no one expects - least of all Downing Street - that a U.K. national will be the first Secretary-General. He is more likely to be a Canadian.

This gives the clue to the new value of an old international institution. The Commonwealth must become a link of goodwill and mutual assistance between nations of every race, colour and continent and in every stage of development; it must utilize the feeling of family, which persists, to build up a meaningful, non-discriminatory co-operation, based not so much on preferential trade as preferential feeling. If it can do this, the Commonwealth can enter a period of new and wider usefulness. It is our policy to do everything we can to achieve that result.

Then there is NATO, another international club of which we are a charter and dues-paying member. I believe in the Atlantic coalition as much as I ever did, but less as a defence coalition and more as a foundation for a closely co-operating political and economic community. Unfortunately, there is little political and economic cement these days for Atlantic unity - while the bond of collective defence for collective security, though still the main force that holds the Alliance together, is becoming weaker as the conditions which brought about NATO in the first place change. Those conditions were primarily the menace of Soviet military aggression and the temptation of European weakness and division.

Now Europe is strong and flourishing. This, plus Eastern Europe's gradual emergence from satellite dependency, and other things, has lessened the immediate fear of armed aggression by the Soviet Union.

We must now re-examine the principles on which the Atlantic Alliance was founded 16 years ago. The best result would be to come closer together, organically, on the old treaty basis. But that is impossible at the moment if we wish to include the France of General de Gaulle. And, certainly in Canada, it is impossible to contemplate an Atlantic coalition without France.

Alternatively, we may have to consider new arrangements by which Europe takes responsibility for the security of one side of the Atlantic, North America for the other, with interlocking co-operative arrangements for mutual assistance against attack.

I do not suggest that such a development in the Atlantic Alliance is going to take place this year or next. Nor do I suggest that anything we do should run counter to the building up of the Atlantic Community in every way open to us.

I merely state that the defence arrangements suitable for 1948 may not be appropriate for 1965, or possible, for long, after 1965.