

fashion, and the Valletta procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The CPC's support to CSBM implementation and related activities, including the communications network and military doctrine seminars, was a further aspect of CSCE conflict prevention, as was the human dimension mechanism in its strengthened form in the Moscow Document.

The Canadian goal post-Berlin was to improve on these various components. Now that the CSO could meet to deal with emerging crises, it needed a menu of crisis management options, working through the CPC as implementing agency. Procedures such as mediation, good offices, fact-finding, arbitration, monitoring and peacekeeping would have to be developed and tailored to deal with the communal conflicts the CSCE was most likely to face. The dispute settlement procedures would have to be made compulsory and their writ extended beyond the narrow range of international conflicts to which they then applied. The human dimension mechanism would have to be more closely tied to the conflict prevention machinery. Also, Canada continued to hope that participating states could agree on a system that would automatically provide for the initiation of CSCE conflict prevention measures.

As delegations moved forward to the next Council meeting, to be held in Prague on January 30-31, 1992, the main questions on the agenda were the proposed enhancement of the Conflict Prevention Centre (as per the Berlin document) and the possibility of CSCE peacekeeping forces.

CPC Enhancement

In Vienna, the CPC Consultative Committee was attempting to agree on ways to enhance the CPC as a contribution to the general recommendations on the development of CSCE structures and institutions being prepared by the CSO for ministerial consideration at Prague. Opinion on the appropriate scope of the CPC continued to range from the cautious to the ambitious: the US believed that the Centre had not been entirely successful in carrying out the tasks already assigned to it and wished to avoid saddling the Centre with more, while others, led by Canada, Germany, Poland and Hungary, continued to see opportunity for CPC expansion in the crisis management, conflict prevention and security dialogue spheres. Related to this debate was one on the appropriate division of labour between the CPC and the CSO, which centred on the question of *when* the CPC should become involved in a potential conflict. Those in favour of a more political CPC argued that the Centre should be involved at an early stage, before the dispute heated up. Others were of the opinion that dispute settlement and crisis management should remain the purview of the CSO. The Yugoslav war -- with which the CSO had been dealing since July 1991 -- pointed to the fact that future European crises were likely to be more political than military in nature. If the CPC remained limited to the military sphere, its actual conflict prevention role could turn out to be quite limited.

Further complicating the debate was uncertainty about the role the CPC would play in the post-Helsinki security forum. Several states were drawn to a British proposal to make the CPC Consultative Committee the new arms control negotiating-cum-supervisory body. Others, including Canada, favoured a Finnish proposal for leaving the Consultative Committee focused primarily on implementation issues and creating a second, parallel body for negotiations. This would allow the CPC to concentrate on verification and conflict management mechanisms. It was difficult to make assumptions about the CPC when the