

suggested that the initial inspection team could have as many as five inspectors. This would mean that the CW stockpiles of the superpowers would absorb 85 inspectors on-site at their major installations. It should be noted that this assumes that the inspectorate will be continuously present at a stockpile site where destruction will eventually take place. There is a requirement for their presence until a monitoring system is installed and operational as well as for continuous presence during active destruction periods. The number of five inspectors is consistent with trial inspection experience but if a facility has multiple destruction lines or operates more than one shift then these numbers will have to be increased.

The other assumption concerning stockpiles was that 12 other nations would declare the possession of chemical weapons. The stockpiles could be small. Verification and auditing are unlikely to be labour intensive but politically will probably require teams of three inspectors. The long term securing of the facilities might be difficult, given their probable locations. Initial inspection would require 36 inspectors who also may have to be continuously present at these sites.

Hence this study suggests that CW stockpile management could require 121 inspectors present full time on-site. The initial assessment is that there will be a requirement of 40 inspectors for the United States, 45 for the Soviet Union, and 36