

syndicates controls distinct kinds of products. The whole country is divided into zones, and, in the allocation of orders, the general welfare of all constituents is considered. Thus it is usual for a British order to be allotted to one particular district, Russian orders are usually placed in another, and so on. That is, foreign orders are allocated where they can be filled most advantageously. Geographical position, equipment, cost of production, are all considered.

In the development of Great Britain's iron and steel trade no such control has been present. Combinations, large and small, have been organized, but competition between individual interests has prevented any approaching the convention that exists in Germany. No tariff protects the British manufacturer. The national temperament does not take kindly to the rigid organization that appears to be the central idea of German civilization.

But, be these reasons sufficient or insufficient, the fact remains that Great Britain is falling behind, and that Germany, to a marked extent, is profiting by Great Britain's recession.

The hopeful aspects of the situation are that Great Britain is slowly becoming aware of the truth, and that she has natural advantages far greater than those with which Germany is endowed.

### LA ROSE AFFAIRS.

The first Report of La Rose Consolidated Mines Company was dated June 20th, 1908. Appended to this are three reports on the physical condition of the properties of La Rose Mines, Limited. The specialists engaged to report were, respectively, Messrs. Watson & Watson, Mr. T. R. Drummond, and Prof. Willet G. Miller.

Dr. W. G. Miller, whose report is dated August 9th, 1907, figured the silver content of ore blocked out on two sides in La Rose, 6,518 tons, at 8,020,870 ounces. Ten months later Messrs. Watson & Watson arrived at an estimate of 4,894,065 ounces as the silver contained in 10,358.17 tons of ore "practically developed" and ore "indicated." About the same time, Mr. T. R. Drummond estimated 5,303,000 ounces of silver as the probable yield of 5,484 tons of "ore available." While the basis of comparison is uncertain, owing to the divergent terminology and methods employed in the three reports, they may be used to indicate the general conditions of the mine. Mr. Drummond's estimate covers less territory than does the report of the Messrs. Watson. His figures are considerably higher for the main vein, No. 3 vein, and McDonald No. 5. Hence it is most suitable to take, for purposes of discussion, the Watson estimate of 4,894,065 ounces as the amount of silver indicated at the end of the fiscal year 1907-1908.

The output of La Rose as between August, 1907, and June, 1908, was approximately 900,000 ounces.

Taking Dr. Miller's figures, and disregarding any reserves added during that period, this would leave 7,120,870 ounces of silver in ore blocked out on two sides. As noted above, the total "practically developed" silver in almost twice the tonnage of ore, ten months later, is given by Messrs. Watson & Watson as 4,894,065 ounces, a discrepancy of more than two million ounces.

During the fiscal year ending June 1st, 1909, silver was shipped from La Rose to the amount of 2,979,953.97 ounces. Partly developed ore at that date is reported by Mr. R. B. Watson to contain 4,307,705 ounces. To this total may be added 454,013 ounces contained in "McDonald" country rock, and 206,700 ounces "indicated" in No. 3 vein, making a grand total of 4,968,418 ounces contained in ore reserves.

As plans and sections of the mine do not accompany either the annual or the special reports, and as Mr. Watson makes only vague reference to progress and does not specify the footage made on any vein, it is impossible to analyze the figures referred to above. We may remark here that this omission is inexcusable. Shareholders should insist upon detailed information as to progress and development. That this is necessary is amply proved by the history of La Rose itself. The general manager's report should be an actual history of work done in each section of the mine. If this has been prevented heretofore by speculative interests, there is all the more reason that the objectionable policy of repression be discontinued at once. In this we are confident that General Manager R. B. Watson will concur. He is looked upon as a competent engineer. Until now he has had no opportunity to prove himself anything but an important cog in an elaborate stock-market device.

Roughly, the position of La Rose to-day may be summed up thus:—

The total capitalization is about \$7,500,000. Since organization of La Rose Consolidated, the net value of silver shipped aggregates now about \$1,750,000. Net profits to be expected from ore reserves, on Mr. Watson's estimate, will hardly equal this sum. No substantial development work has been performed on the other properties. Lawson, according to general belief, has not by any means lived up to its promise. The attention of the executive has been devoted, not to putting La Rose and the subsidiary mines in good condition, but to unloading their stock at the top of the market. Having accomplished this, most especially and most regrettably in London, the chief manipulators resigned and new directors were appointed.

We may interject here one or two questions that are decidedly pertinent. As pointed out above, there is no possibility of comparing the three estimates mentioned in our first paragraph. But we may ask Mr. Watson if, in estimating his reserves, he is revaluing part of his old reserves, or touching new ground entirely? What and where are his reserves, anyway? How do they check