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*Mao Tse-tung, leader of the People's Republic of China, is shown on the podium at the Chinese Communist Party's Tenth National Congress in Peking last August. The dramatic development at the congress was the announcement of the appointment of Wang Hung-wen, a relatively young party leader, to the Number Three position in the Chinese Politburo.*

had swung back and forth too rapidly to promote the kind of confidence required by the lower-level official to make a decision even on the simplest of issues. Would the line of today remain that of tomorrow? Decisions of an administrative nature were delayed at lower levels lest they involve implications of policy that might be questioned, if not immediately then later. The Cultural Revolution may well have made China's leaders more receptive to the needs of the masses. It is impossible for the foreign observer, even at close quarters, to judge with confidence. Although it tried, the Cultural Revolution did not, however, provide a remedy for that other malaise of modern bureaucracies, "bureaucratism".

Despite the risks involved in any political upheaval as massive as the Cultural Revolution, Chinese leaders today speak of more to come in the future. As long as Mao lives, or those committed to his revolutionary ideals survive in power, or close to it, periodic attempts at the same thing are likely. But those of the future are unlikely to emerge on the same scale. They are much more likely to resemble the "mass campaigns" of earlier years than the total upheaval represented by the GPCR.

The political, economic, social and foreign policies of Peking since 1969, and particularly since 1971, reflect both the shortcomings and costs of the Cultural Revolution. But at the same time they point to the continuing tensions and contradictions that may well make more cul-

tural revolutions in the future inevitable.

The main thrust of political activity in China during the post-GPCR period has been the rebuilding of the Chinese Communist Party. The successful completion of that, at least at the central level, and the frenzied activity in recreating its auxiliary organizations — particularly the unions, the Chinese Communist Youth League, peasant associations and, less successfully, the Women's Federation — was symbolized by the convening of the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973. A corollary of this shift in power back to the Party has been the accelerated rehabilitation of veteran Party cadres, climaxed in April 1973 by the reappearance of Vice-Premier Teng Hsiaoping, once labelled "the other power-holder in the Party taking the capitalist road".

### Impact of Tenth Party Congress

The Tenth Party Congress also represented the personal achievement of Premier Chou En-lai, whose policies and priorities, both foreign and domestic, have largely shaped the path of the PRC during this period. The moulding of a new coalition of essentially moderate civil and military leaders, with a modest infusion of "new blood", combined with the diminished stature but not disgrace of some of the leading radicals like Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan, was a remarkable accomplishment.

The most dramatic surprise of the Tenth Party Congress was the appointment to the Number Three position in the new inner circle of Wang Hung-wen. At 38, Wang is literally separated by a generation from Mao, Chou and most of the other top leaders. His appointment was both symbolic and substantive. It represented to the masses, and particularly the young, that the inner circle is not the preserve of veteran revolutionary leaders. In fact, however, the average age of the Standing Committee of the Politburo has gone up since the last Party Congress from 69 to 71 years.

To the workers, it provided a new link with the ruling *élite*, for Wang had come almost directly from their ranks. The radicals, too, must have taken some comfort from Wang's meteoric rise, not simply because of the role he played in the Cultural Revolution but also from his speeches at the Congress. While Chou En-lai talked of "struggles" yet to come, Wang referred to revolutions like the Cultural Revolution that would have to occur "many times in the future". But Wang's appointment was also substantive, for, in my opinion, he should be characterized not as a "radical" but rather as an astute politician and com-

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