

in all environments and which also provided that if such an agreement was not reached expeditiously, the Disarmament Committee should conclude a treaty prohibiting testing in the environments where radioactive fallout occurs.

At this juncture it became more and more apparent that the position of the non-aligned countries as expressed in their resolution was very close to that of the Soviet Union which favoured an unpoliced moratorium on testing underground pending negotiations on a comprehensive treaty banning all tests.

Both the Indian and Swedish Delegations made statements in Committee explaining that the request for an end to all testing by January 1 was not a proposal for an unpoliced moratorium but the expression of a wish that the nuclear powers would be able to achieve this end by that time. Nevertheless it was clear that the resolution as a whole favoured the Soviet position and would, if adopted, have caused very serious embarrassment and difficulty for the United States in the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests and in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Both the United States and the United Kingdom Delegations were obviously troubled by the draft resolution and the United States officials privately expressed considerable apprehension about the difficulty of trying to negotiate with the Soviet Union for a treaty with effective verification against the background of a General Assembly resolution which appeared to endorse the idea of an unpoliced moratorium.

#### *Canadian Position*

In the Canadian intervention in the First Committee on October 10, the Canadian Representative, General E.L.M. Burns, emphasized that Canada opposed all nuclear weapons tests and wished to see an end to all testing by January 1, 1963. He explained that as a first step in achieving this there should be a ban on nuclear testing in those environments where fallout occurs. Secondly, there should be negotiations for a treaty banning tests in all environments. The Canadian position was thus clearly for the achievement of an end to all testing by agreement among the nuclear powers. However, some delegations interpreted the Canadian position as being in favour of an unpoliced moratorium. This interpretation of the Canadian position was dispelled when Canada submitted the amendments described in the following paragraph.

An opportunity for avoiding the adoption of the non-aligned resolution in a form favourable to the Soviet position was presented by the exchange of letters of October 27/28 between Chairman Khrushchev, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan arising out of the Cuban crisis. The Canadian delegation proposed to the Western countries and to the non-aligned countries that neither the non-aligned nor the United States' resolution should be put to the vote, but instead that a resolution should be adopted welcoming the recent statements of the heads of governments concerned and urging the governments represented on the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests to settle the remaining differences between their countries on this subject and to issue instructions to their representatives on the Nuclear Tests Sub-Committee to achieve this end.<sup>30</sup> While reaction to this resolution was favourable among the eight non-aligned and Western countries, the Soviet Union refused to agree to support it as a substitute for the non-aligned resolution. In view of the Soviet Union's attitude, the non-aligned countries were themselves not willing to withdraw their resolution and to support the suggested Canadian resolution. Accordingly, on October 31, the Canadian delegation as a way out of the impasse, submitted a series of amendments (A/C.1/L.313) to the 37-Power draft resolution. These amendments were patterned after the draft resolution which Canada had suggested shortly prior to the tabling of the Canadian amendments but contained

<sup>30</sup> Voir/See document 708.